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Lacan, Ideology, and Military Behavioral Health: Exploring Interpellation Psychodiscursively

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Abstract

Recent research in psychosocial studies that draws on a theoretical framework of Lacanian psychoanalysis has granted social psychology with a rich understanding of individuals' investments in discursive subject positions. The Lacanian psychosocial conception of subjectivity considers how multiple paradoxical narratives, conditioned by desire, form a complex subject constituted through discourse. However, this paradigm has yet to produce a psychosocial discursive analysis of subjection via ideological interpellation. This discourse analysis combines psychoanalytic cultural criticism with Lacanian psychosocial studies to produce an analytic methodology. The thesis then employs this methodology to examine a case study of three interview transcripts from Dr. Janice Haaken's documentary *MIND ZONE: Therapists Behind the Front Lines*, exploring the discursive practices in the subjectivity construction of ideologically interpellated Combat Stress Control therapists. I show how the interviewee, the Colonel and U.S. Commander of a Combat Stress Control unit in Afghanistan accords with the complex subject of Lacanian psychosocial studies and how the military identity he is both interpellated into and performs depends upon an attachment conditioned by desire. Having demonstrated how the psychoanalytic concept of desire is articulated in the Colonel's discourse, the thesis concludes by suggesting avenues for social change using insights from the Lacanian theory of discourse to critique subjection by ideology.

Keywords: Lacan, psychoanalysis, psychodiscursive, interpellation, military, psychosocial

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Introduction

This thesis examines the construction of subjectivity in ideological interpellation through an analysis of the discourse of military behavioral health professionals. The thesis undertakes a case study of three interview transcripts between Dr. Janice Haaken and the Colonel of the 113th Army Combat Stress Control (CSC) detachment derived from Haaken's documentary film *MIND ZONE: Therapists Behind the Front Lines* (post-production) which examines 'the mission' of behavioral health professionals in the military. I analyze, using a Lacanian psychoanalytic discursive (*psychodiscursive*) approach, how the Colonel is both subjected and one who subjects, simultaneously submitting and internalizing the behavioral health discourse of the United States military as a centralized state apparatus. The Colonel discursively performs these roles as he speaks from a powerful position as commander of the 113th, constructing the identity of the ideal soldier-therapist as a *force-multiplier*. In so doing, I combine Mark Bracher's (1993) psychoanalytic cultural criticism in *Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change: A Psychoanalytic Cultural Criticism* with aspects of Ian Parker's seven theoretical elements from "Lacanian Discourse Analysis in Psychology: Seven Theoretical Elements" (2005) and "Psychosocial studies: Lacanian discourse analysis negotiating interview text" (2010) to form an innovative methodology. Utilizing this methodology, I argue two points in the thesis: first, that the Colonel demonstrates the discursively constituted subject articulated by Lacanian psychosocial scholars—respecting both the irreducibility of the psychological and the social (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Parker, 2010) and a split subjectivity with polyvalent narratives (Young & Frosh, 2010); second, that the combination of Bracher's (1993) cultural criticism and Parker's (2005, 2010) theoretical elements provides insights into the workings and paradoxical identifications

founded in interpellation through an analysis of unconscious desire. This analysis concludes with a critique of ideologically interpellated subjectivity, along with suggestions for avenues of social change through the subversion of ideology.

To set this analysis of ideologically interpellated subjectivity into context, the first section of the thesis provides a review of the field of psychosocial studies, focusing specifically on scholars who employ Lacanian psychoanalysis in the discursive analysis of subjectivity. Psychosocial studies emerged as a qualitative trans-disciplinary research program, in the wake of the post-1980's reaction to the dominance of an experimental and cognitive approach in social psychological research, as a field that takes into consideration the social and political influences that structure subjectivity (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hepburn, 2003). Psychosocial studies shifts the focus of social psychological research on human subjectivity from an idealized, rational, consistent, and undivided human subject of “mainstream” (Branney, 2008, p. 574) cognitive and experimental psychology, to an understanding of subjectivity as constructed by language. What is now called the 'turn-to-language'—or the discursive turn—in social psychology understands individual subjectivity as forged by linguistic processes, examining the way that discourses create *subject positions* for individuals. Discursive subject positions emphasize both how individuals use language to construct their identity and how language in social context determines the identity of individuals. The focus on language as a constitutive component in the formation or social construction of identity uses discourse analysis as its methodological investigative practice. Incorporating social construction into theories of social psychological subjectivity highlight how an individual's psychological properties, as irrational, contradictory and dynamic, are inextricable from the social world within which they are situated.

The field of psychosocial studies regards research focusing strictly upon an individual's psychological components as predominantly conservative, as these approaches tend to neglect the social-political structures that constitute subjectivity. This concern with social and political forces is due in large part to the emergence of the field as a reaction to experimental and cognitive research in social psychology, as well as the intellectual influence drawn from critical social psychology, feminism, post-structuralism, and critical psychoanalysis (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Psychosocial studies theorizes human subjectivity as complex, paradoxical, and fluctuating within social worlds and discursive practices. Given psychosocial studies interest in political and social forces, the field investigates how these discursive practices place individuals into disadvantageous subject positions. The object of study in psychosocial research is, therefore, the conceptualization of a theory of subjectivity that avoids simplistically demarcating social and psychological influences; a practice that individualizes subjects by suggesting that the psyche is uninfluenced by the social (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010).

Psychosocial studies' conception of subjectivity as discursively constituted has raised questions, however, regarding how a subject *becomes* a discourse user (Parker, 1997). How do people find themselves in specific discursive subject positions, and what is the relationship between the subject as discourse user and the subject as positioned by discourse? The pursuit of a theory of subjectivity that can provide answers to these questions, incorporating both the psychological and the social without a complete evacuation of subjective experience, has prompted psychosocial theorists to engage psychoanalysis as a methodology. Psychoanalysis provides the researcher with an interpretive account of how individuals can become consciously or unconsciously invested in specific disadvantageous subject positions (Frosh & Baraitser,

2008). Psychoanalysis also provides an account of subjectivity that respects social constructionist insights into identity, while simultaneously allowing for theorizing about subjective agency despite this agency's lack of conscious and rational control (Georgaca, 2005).

Two schools of psychoanalytic thought have predominated in psychosocial studies, developing two separate styles of psychoanalytic psychosocial discursive interpretation—otherwise known as psychodiscursive. The first style of interpretation utilizes a method derived from Melanie Klein's object-relations theory, while the second style of interpretation tends to draw on methods derived from Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory. Many differences exist between the two interpretive approaches. However, Lacanian psychosocial theorists' main contention with scholars using a Kleinian approach is their use of psychoanalysis as a sense-making tool (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Lacanian theorists argue that Kleinian influenced interpretative strategies often emphasize hidden meanings that provide evidence for a “defended or divided subject” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009, p. 3) beneath a subject's discourse, theorizing psychosocial subjectivity as composed of distinct psychological and social entities (Jefferson, 2008).

Lacanian psychodiscursive approaches, on the other hand, attempt to regard this division as “purely tactical” (Frosh and Baraitser, 2008, p. 349)—meaning that any division between the two is merely artificial and that the psychological and the social are indivisible. The psychological and social components of subjectivity, according to Lacanian psychodiscursive theorists, blend together through socially negotiated discourse. Language, however, according to Lacan, always and must fail to express what individuals really mean. Disagreement and the inability to consciously articulate desires foster discourse, as one continues to talk in an to

attempt to further explain what one means. Lacanian psychodiscursive approaches, therefore, conceive of subjectivity as socially regulated, while also split between the truth of one's desire and one's simultaneous inability to articulate this truth. A Lacanian psychodiscursive analysis strives to respect this inherent split—yielding a complex and divided subject composed of conflicting narratives—by examining the deadlocks that structure a dynamic subjectivity and by avoiding the production of a totalizing and pathologizing interpretation of one's subjectivity.

Lacanian psychodiscursive approaches do not attempt to fix or reduce a subject's experience, but instead attempt to disrupt, disorganize, and deconstruct a subject's method of sense-making in a discourse. This method of disruption is performed in order to understand the subject's discourse as polyvalent and composed of a plurality of narratives, while also examining how narrative meaning is composed out of chains of signifiers (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Saville Young & Frosh, 2009; Saville Young & Frosh, 2010). Thus, the use of Lacanian psychoanalysis allows the psychodiscursive analyst to conceptualize subjectivity polyvalently, understanding individuals' subjectivity as over-determined by a plurality of both conscious and unconscious subject positions simultaneously (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009). This method of respecting a text's polyvalency avoids approaching a text as something that can be understood by determining the hidden meanings beneath the divided subject's conscious awareness. A subject's discourse should instead be analyzed as something that can be opened up, making clear that the structure of the text is composed of a network of signifiers and irreducible non-signifying elements (Parker, 2005).

The subsequent section explicates the work of Bracher and Parker in the context of the wider field of Lacanian psychodiscursive approaches. I discuss Bracher and Parker in order to

lay the groundwork for a methodology, sensitive to the analysis of a complex and divided subject, to be used in my analysis of the interview transcripts. The combination of Bracher's (1993) Lacanian methodology for cultural criticism, assessing the interpellative effects of desire and identification in discourse, with a selection of Parker's (2005) theoretical elements for a Lacanian psychodiscursive reading of “texts”—“all forms of socially structured signification ... speech of the 'analysand’” (p. 164)—will be used to perform an innovative psychodiscursive analysis of ideologically interpellated subjectivity. To perform this psychodiscursive analysis, I utilize Bracher's (1993) methodology—the model of “three logical steps” (p. 74)—supplementing it with Parker's theoretical elements to facilitate the identification of Lacanian theoretical elements in the interview transcripts.

Following Lacan's own lack of a “coherent delimited” (p. 166) method for analyzing discourse, Parker's (2005) analyses have resisted formalization into an explicit methodology. However, Parker's (1997) stipulations for rethinking subjectivity in psychoanalytic discourse analysis, along with his writings on the application of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory in the practice of discourse analysis, have been influential in the development of the theoretical foundations for Lacanian psychodiscursive interpretation. In a series of publications, Parker (2005, 2010) contributes to the field of Lacanian psychodiscursive analysis by positing and demonstrating the usefulness of seven theoretical elements as a set of considerations for those undertaking data collection and discourse analysis guided by Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (Branney, 2008). While Parker's seven elements do not comprise a formalized methodology, the framework they provide is especially effective as a set of theoretical resources for analyzing texts using Lacanian psychoanalytic theory.

Despite an extensive amount of scholarship in psychosocial studies, there has yet to be developed a method for psychodiscursively analyzing the construction of subjectivity in ideological interpellation. If one takes Louis Althusser's (1971) conception of subjectivity seriously—that an individual's subjectivity is forged via the process of ideological interpellation, transforming individuals by constructing them into subjects—then Lacanian psychodiscursive method must be developed to explore the discursive practices that surround a polyvalent subjectivity constructed in, and the desires that underlie, ideological interpellation. Ideology is defined here as a ruling system of practices and rituals that play a formative role in psychological development by weaving themselves into the very fabric of the subject's reality and continuously reifying this reality through successive acts of interpellation (Althusser, 1971).

To develop a method of analysis sensitive to the discursive operations of ideological interpellation, I have combined a selection of 14 aspects of Parker's (2010, 2005) seven theoretical elements with Bracher's (1993) method of psychoanalytic cultural criticism. Bracher (1993) uses Lacanian psychoanalytic theory both to account for the way that discourse ideologically interpellates subjects through desire and identification, and to theorize a methodology for inducing “collective psychological change and thereby social change” (p. 14). Subjectivity, for Bracher, is constructed in relation to a specific discourse. The Lacanian big Other in a discourse—an ideological cultural force and the locus of a subject's speech—acts upon subjects' desires in producing an identification. Subjects construct their subjectivity and ego ideal—signifiers a subject speaks and with which they identify all in accordance with the big Other's ideal—in language, always validating their subject position in relation to a larger ideological force (Evans, 1996; Parker, 2005; Žižek, 2007). Bracher then makes use of Lacan's

theory of the four discourses to elucidate how, depending on the discursive position of the subject, their speech functions to produce different psychological effects.

To induce social change, Bracher develops a three step method of cultural criticism that draws on therapeutic practice Lacanian psychoanalysis. Beginning with identifying the manifest collective effect of the discourse on an audience, to then describing the discursive elements (Lacanian theoretical constructs) responsible for the manifest content, to finally identifying the desires—or “non-manifest ... subjective factors ... appealed to by the discursive elements” (p. 76), Bracher's (1993) three logical step methodology uses a Lacanian interpretation of a cultural discourse to demonstrate how desires and identifications arise from words to interpellate subjects. The purpose of Bracher's (1993) interpretation is to induce subjects to abandon their identifications with ideological discourses—instead of forcing them to recognize new identifications—through the exposition and acknowledgment of desires repressed and prohibited by the ideological discourses. This method of interpretation produces identification with these formerly repressed desires—the desire for the love of the big Other—where the subject forms new more emancipatory values in place of ideologically conditioned values.

The combination of Bracher and Parker's work produces a Lacanian psychodiscursive method to analyze ideological interpellation, demonstrating the way that ideology suppresses critical opposition by promulgating a totalizing—and even contradictory—discourse rooted in unconscious desires. Ideological interpellation is dangerous because it suspends a subject's access to knowledge that positively benefits one's well-being (the *a* or object cause of desire) and the well-being of others (the case of, for example, behavioral health professionals in charge of soldiers' mental health.)

I demonstrate this methodology by performing a case study of three interview transcripts. This case study enlists Bracher's (1993) analysis of political-rhetorical discourse to understand how subjectivity, specifically the identity of the ideal soldier-therapist as a force-multiplier, is constructed in ideological interpellation. The three interview transcript texts chosen for this analysis are part of a documentary film by Haaken (post-production) entitled *MIND ZONE: Therapists Behind the Front Lines*. *MIND ZONE* follows military behavioral health professionals in the 113th Army Combat Stress Control (CSC) unit in order to tell two interwoven stories: first, the often untold tale of behavioral health professionals in the military and their difficult role of providing therapy to emotionally and mentally wounded soldiers; and second, the story of psychology in the military and the ethics and efficacy of attempting to manage soldiers' mental health through applications of therapeutic techniques on the battlefield. The film also focuses on military behavioral health professionals' conflicting missions as therapists: the first mission, as force multipliers, to maintain a large and effective fighting force, keeping soldiers in the fight through the use of psychology with little regard for the long term implications of sustained stress; and the second mission, as therapeutic healers of soldiers, of taking the present and future mental well-being of soldiers as their top priority and acting accordingly.

The interview transcripts selected for this analysis feature a dialogue between Haaken, a female professor, researcher, clinical psychologist, activist and director of *MIND ZONE*, and the Colonel, a male commander of the 113th Army Reserve CSC Unit. The unit that the Colonel commands is made up of 35 therapists who have recently been deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The first of the three interviews between Haaken and the Colonel was conducted

on May 21, 2011 in Mountain View, CA. The second and third interviews were conducted at the Joint Bases Lewis-McChord, WA on June 9, 2011 and Kandahar, Afghanistan on July 9, 2011, respectively. The third interview also features dialog between Major R. D., the clinical director for the 113th CSC and Major J. S., a clinical psychologist who was previously deployed twice with the CSC unit in Iraq and is now head of a team specializing post-traumatic stress disorder at the Portland Veterans' Administration.

Of the 110 hours of interview footage shot by Haaken, the three interview texts were selected for this analysis because they demonstrate two important problematics. First, the interview texts display most clearly an exploration of the primary question guiding the documentary film: namely, how do Army CSC personnel simultaneously serve two opposing masters—acting as force multipliers in the name of United States Military, on the one hand, and as therapists respecting the tenets of their profession on the other? Second, the Colonel's discourse with Haaken, in specific, provides an optimistic yet contradictory authoritative voice in the name of the United States Military's agenda, illustrating the tensions between the fulfillment of these professionals' two opposing missions. These tensions, in regards to the two opposing missions, characterize the ideologically interpellated subject that the Colonel performs and constructs, making it applicable to this Lacanian psychodiscursive analysis.

The Colonel's emphasis on the importance of the military identity and his defense of the concept of the force multiplier constructs for the audience the United States Military's ideal soldier-therapist. The Colonel uses language to negotiate this dual role, as he speaks with knowledge on the subject of behavioral health in the military. The Colonel always grounds his authority and knowledge in American interests or in the interests of the United States Military.

This same language simultaneously obfuscates the situation, however, as Haaken's contentions emphasize. The concept of a force multiplier, as defined by the Colonel, entails maintaining the number of active soldiers through the use of medical techniques and behavioral therapy, keeping more soldiers in the fight. Haaken contends that the goal of providing relief, calm and peace to the soldier experiencing mental trauma and of keeping soldiers on the battlefield serve differing purposes and cannot be conceived of unitarily. Nevertheless, the Colonel insists that there is no conflict between the mental health mission and the overall military mission, arguing that the two missions are one in the same.

The Colonel's construction of the military behavioral health therapist's identity covers over an opposing duality by denying that there is any opposition between the two missions at all. The Colonel's denial, however, is always also an appeal to the benevolence and omniscience of the American military, further grounding his contentions in a form of ideological authority.

I wouldn't say it's separate. I would say it's- everything's connected to everything. You're not going to seize and hold ground if you have soldiers who are not mentally fit or combat ready. You're not. So I think it's all associated and connected to- And that's why we're here (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel's use of language to both construct and obfuscate an understanding of the mission of military behavioral health professionals as a unitary conception, while simultaneously denying any conflict by appealing to the authority of the United States (the big Other), demonstrates how the Colonel is discursively constructed as an interpellated subject of a specific American and military ideology.

I suggest that these tensions in the Colonel's performance of an ideologically interpellated subject and in the construction of the ideal military behavioral health professional as force multiplier lend themselves to a Lacanian psychodiscursive analysis because 1) the discrepancy

between the Colonel's identity as a healer and a force multiplier is covered over by a reliance on the American military as a big Other; 2) the contentions over linguistic meaning highlight language as a socially negotiated play of words and signifiers; 3) the constant deferral of meaning in regard to the mission results in the disruption of sense; and 4) the duality inherent in the contested definition of the mission demonstrates that military behavioral health professionals possess a polyvalent and contradictory identity that resists a fixed meaning.

The negotiations over the singularity or duality of the mission in the interview transcripts demonstrate how language functions as the play of words and signifiers. The documentary itself is composed of a series of interviews and questions in regards to the nature of the mission and the identity of military behavioral health personnel, all of which are negotiated in language. Both Haaken and the Colonel discuss these issues through a play of signifiers, all connected to a network of other signifiers, with their meaning never completely anchored or resolved in entirety.

Through this process of research and analysis, one signifier in particular has become the primary focus of interest. The signifier of *mission* is simultaneously the subject of the documentary's primary problem and the word that is most furiously debated in the interview transcripts selected for this analysis. My identification of the signifier mission follows my interpretation of the injunction of Lacanian psychodiscursive theorists to disrupt sense, paying attention to the deferral of meaning in signifiers and the deadlocks of perspective between subjects (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Parker, 2005, 2010). The analysis of deadlocks and disagreements lends itself to the way the subject of the mission is negotiated in the interview transcripts. Lacanian psychodiscursive approaches also attempt to identify the non-sensical

words in a discourse—the aim being to identify the irreducible and traumatic¹ signifiers that subjects are subjected to—which is relevant in regards to how the mission is spoken about.

Always deferring absolute signification, the mission remains a signifier whose meaning is never fully agreed upon by the Colonel and Haaken.

The final section of this thesis concludes with a discussion of the results of my analysis. I engage with the practice of reflexivity demonstrated by Lacanian psychodiscursive scholars and briefly explore potential avenues for social change via Lacan's discourse of the Analyst following Bracher (1993).

Following Frosh and Baraitser (2008), reflexivity in psychosocial studies entails that an analysis is never a neutral or objective study. The act of knowledge construction in human science research must be understood as part and parcel with the reconstruction of one's own consciousness and process of meaning-making. Reflexivity, therefore, regards the method of investigation and the subjectivity of the researcher as inextricable from the object of study (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008).

Because knowledge and subjectivity are “co-constructed” in an interview process, the role of researcher and researched have a “determinative influence upon the end project of social analysis” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, pp. 358-359), requiring an active reflection on power structures, discursive positions, expectations of the researcher, and the process of determining meaningful elements in the text.

¹ For Lacan (1977/1998), the signifiers that are “irreducible, traumatic, non-meanings” (p. 251) represent points of trauma, or encounters with what Lacan calls the Real. While Sigmund Freud argues that, in psychoanalysis, psychical trauma is the result of a subject's inability to understand the excitation caused by an external stimulus, Lacan adds that this trauma is also unable to be symbolized (Homer, 2008). The Lacanian definition of trauma is, therefore, that which cannot be integrated into the symbolic system of language, emphasizing that despite the subject's attempts to explain their own mental suffering, there is always something that resists symbolization and is left over. The analyst consoles the analysand by moving them to first identify the trauma and then, second, explain the trauma through an interpretation, symbolizing the piece of the Real upon which the subject has become fixated.

Following this understanding of reflexivity, each reading of the text that I provide is a politically motivated reconstruction of both the text and the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory used to interpret it (Parker, 2005). This analysis is one amongst many “reflexive re-makings of the present and the past” (Parker, 2005, pp. 170-171), and I recognize that this interpretation should neither aim to fix the meaning of the text, nor present itself as more valid than other potential interpretations. While not presenting a comprehensive critical analysis of my personal devotion to political projects or “suppositions about the nature of the world” (Parker, 2005, p. 173), I attempt to put forward my own political beliefs and motivations in regards to the use of psychoanalysis in this thesis. This represents Parker’s (1994) main point of view towards reflexivity in qualitative research: the analyst must understand that reflexivity entails neither a mere disclosure of their investments or feelings in regards to the text, nor the disclosure of the researcher’s personal journey that has lead them to their research. Reflexivity entails the recognition that both subjectivity and objectivity are always determined in relation to the researcher’s institutional, political and cultural narratives and relations (Dunker & Parker, 2009).

Lacanian psychoanalytic theory in discourse analysis must be used to provide a critical reading of a discourse, and not to diagnose the subject with a specific clinical structure (Parker, 2010). This analysis will not attempt to diagnose Haaken or the Colonel's psychology in its discussion of ideologically interpellated subjectivity. Instead, I will use Lacanian psychoanalytic theory—following Bracher and Parker—to explicate how both Haaken's and the Colonel's subject positions function in relation to one another within the discourse, examining how specific words form a constellation—a signifying structure—to compose the ideologically interpellated subject.

Lastly, both Parker's (2005) as well as Bracher's (1993) work emphasizes the importance of taking the position of the discourse of the Analyst. Bracher's (1993) cultural criticism develops an "analytic strategy" (p. 14)—and a critique of ideological interpellation—modeled after Lacan's discourse of the Analyst. This critique brings about social and psychological change through an awareness of ideology's tyranny exercised through language, the goal being for audiences to produce their own values in accordance with their repressed desires (Bracher, 1993). Producing the discourse of the Analyst in the interpellated subject, for Bracher (1993), necessarily corresponds with two steps integral to a successful conclusion of Lacanian psychoanalytic therapy: altering the sense of identity in the analysand by way of a recognition of how the ideological discourse alienates them from their desire, and moving the analysand towards a recognition of the lack in the ideological discourse with which they once identified.

The goal for Bracher (1993) is to "promote social change by engaging ... some of the same basic processes as those operative in psychoanalytic treatment" (p. 73). However, in accordance with Lacanian psychodiscursive approaches, this does not imply the use of a clinical stance or the diagnosis and treatment of the subjects of this analysis. To connect my use of Lacanian psychodiscursive analysis with Bracher's methodology, I use the discussion section to trace connections between Bracher's critique and the aims of Lacanian psychodiscursive scholars who argue for the resistance of "narrative wholeness" (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010, p. 527) in interpretation, embracing the 'interruptedness of narrative'. I examine how Bracher's model for social change uses the emancipatory potential of Lacanian psychoanalysis in a politically progressive manner, so as to challenge ideological interpellation through psychodiscursive interpretation (Parker, 2010).

Discourse, Lacan, and Psychosocial Studies

The following section contextualizes my psychodiscursive analysis of ideologically interpellated subjectivity in the field of psychosocial studies, focusing specifically on scholars who employ Lacanian psychoanalysis, by providing a two part review of literature. The first part examines the field of psychosocial studies by tracing its emergence within critical social psychology and the turn to language. The second part builds from the first by exploring a subsection of the field of psychosocial studies that engages with psychoanalysis as an interpretive strategy. I also review the divisions in this community of scholarship by examining both Kleinian and Lacanian approaches, moving towards a discussion of the Lacanian trend in greater depth. I conclude this section by explicating a Lacanian psychosocial definition of subjectivity that accords with the Colonel's subjectivity expressed in the interview transcripts.

Psychosocial Studies and the Discursive Turn

The field of psychosocial studies has primarily been, as Valarie Walkerdine (2008) describes it, a British idea. This is not to say that its concerns are irrelevant outside of a British or Western context, although the debates within this community of scholarship have primarily been between British academics. The late 1960's and 1970's emergence of psychosocial studies was, nevertheless, part of a larger dissatisfaction within social psychology now called the 'crisis in social psychology'. The crisis, according to Alexa Hepburn, was primarily the result of scholars in England and the United States feeling that social psychology had strayed too far from its radical origins in "concerns with oppression and exploitation" (2003, p. 24) by adopting a positivist epistemology and focusing overwhelmingly on scientific legitimation.

Hepburn (2003) identifies three thematic critiques that characterize the crisis: "the

critique of individualism”, “the critique of method”, and “the theoretical critique” (p. 25). The critique of individualism, as articulated by Mark Pancer (1997), addressed a problematic shift in social psychology away from a focus on social problems—and social phenomenon as their cause—towards an overall individualized “explanatory focus” (Hepburn, 2003, p. 25). In the discipline’s quest for scientific legitimacy, Pancer (1997) argues that social psychology has lost “touch with its subject matter”, including a moving away from “its roots, from the social problems and concerns that were its first impetus” (p. 161).

Along these same lines, the methodological critique has attacked cognitive social psychology's inclination towards an experimental paradigm in research. Hepburn (2003) argues that experimental research in social psychology is often too artificial, too mechanistic, and too insensitive to the possibility of variance in participator reaction. Experimental research is problematic for social psychology because it forces social processes into sort of a-historical Procrustean bed (Hepburn, 2003).

Keith Tuffin (2004) points out that Rom Harré and Paul Secord’s landmark text *The Explanation of Social Behavior* (1972) provided an essential contribution to this critique by criticizing both the methodological and epistemological approaches in what they saw as a primarily positivist social psychology. Harré and Secord (1972) argue that because of the complex meanings and contexts of social life, positivist methodologies in social psychology cannot produce the kind of objective, unbiased, and neutral results demanded by scientific knowledge.

The methodological critique of positivism is supplemented often by a theoretical critique centering on positivist social psychology's conception of human subjectivity. Hepburn (2003)

notes that the methodological and epistemological critique by Harré and Secord, which utilizes ordinary language philosophy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, also provides a foundation for the critique of social psychology's theoretical framework (p. 28). In their analysis, Harré and Secord critique what they see as positivist social psychology's simplistic conception of the self. They instead reinterpret subjectivity by giving “a preeminent position to language and interaction” (Hepburn, 2003, p. 28), figuring the individual as a language user and a negotiator of one’s own cultural world (Tuffin, 2004, pp. 49-50). Hepburn (2003) notes that this kind of critical analysis is now often deployed in conjunction with post-structuralist philosophy, apparent in the importance placed in critical social psychology on language and discourse (p. 28).

In the mid-1970’s, the crisis in social psychology began to take on an overt leftist political agenda. Positivist and scientific practices in social psychology began to be viewed by critical scholars both as anathema to the radical roots of social psychological research, and as an instrument of institutional control (Spears, 1997). This leftist intellectual climate, with its political precursory elements located in Frankfurt School critical theory and Western Marxist traditions opened up dialogue between social psychology and continental social theory, the philosophy of language, and linguistics (Spears, 1997). Social psychology also began to integrate theory from structuralism, post-structuralism, and psychoanalysis including the work of Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, and the writings of French feminist theorists, including Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément (Walkerdine, 2008). This incorporation has affected present critical reevaluations of social psychology’s conception of subjectivity now studied in psychosocial studies (Henriques et al., 1998; Spears, 1997).

Critical reinterpretations of subjectivity, the influence of linguistics and continental philosophy and social theory, paired with the general dissatisfaction and concern with “conventional quantitative methods” in “experimental-cognitive social psychological research” (Gough & McFadden, 2001, pp. 45-46), culminated in what is now known as the ‘linguistic’ or ‘discursive turn’ in social psychology. The discursive turn is characterized by its reanalysis of subjectivity in social psychology through a focus on the study of discourses. Using qualitative methods, scholars influenced by the discursive turn seek to fill a gap left by positivist quantitative social psychology in its failure to consider the ways that language shapes an individual's subjectivity. The discursive turn's focus on language and its rejection of quantitative analyses, thus, provided the theoretical foundation for psychosocial studies as a more critical method of social psychology (Gough & McFadden, 2001).

Through the analysis of discourse, scholars of psychosocial studies examine the way language use regulates and constructs individuals' social realities (Gough & McFadden, 2001; Tuffin, 2004). Psychosocial scholars consider how discourses—regularities and cultural norms in the way that phenomena and individuals are defined, systems of meaning in competition with one another—shaped by social and political institutions regulate and construct these social realities (Branney, 2008; Gough & McFadden, 2001; Tuffin, 2004). Thus, *subjectivity* replaces *personality* and the self as theoretical constructs utilized by psychosocial studies in order to account for the social formation of identity in discourses. Subjectivity incorporates language into theories of identity formation, as social and cultural forces condition language beyond the control of the individual. Personality as a theoretical construct, on the other hand, focuses too heavily on an individual's inherent characteristics without considering how identity is socially

constituted (Branney, 2008).

The philosophical model adopted by psychosocial studies is social construction. Social construction argues that the subjectivity of individuals is constructed by culturally understood systems of meaning, disseminated in discourses (Hollway, 2011). Social construction attempts to emphasize how individuals' social realities are both negotiated through communication with others, and regulated by the social institutions that surround them (Spears, 1997).

The shift in focus towards an analysis of discourses and the social, cultural and political forces shaping individuals opens up questions in regards to what Wendy Hollway (2011) calls “individual-society dualism” (p. 211). As a discipline, social psychology is concerned with both the individual and society—inner and outer forces that shape identity—in order to explain how the 'out there' becomes internalized and gets 'in here'. Social construction, however, in its focus on language and social discourses, emphasizes almost exclusively the role of outer forces that shape identity, often rejecting the individual cognitive subject as an object of inquiry at all. Is the individual or society more important when considering personal identity, and is it possible to develop theoretical tools that can disassemble this dualism all together (Hollway, 2011)?

The methodology of scholars who address questions of subjectivity construction using discursive methods is classified as psycho-discursive, encompassing the sub-disciplines of discursive psychology and psychosocial (or psycho-social) studies (Branney, 2008).

Psychosocial studies theorizes about subjectivity as a coalescence of social and psychological factors, taking as its main question how one should develop a theory of subjectivity that appropriately integrates the socially constructive aspect of language and discourse, while still considering the psychological components of the subject (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). This is a

difficult task, as psychosocial studies must theorize subjectivity so as to respect individuals' personal experience, agency, emotion, and ethical sensibilities, while simultaneously integrating insights from post-structuralism in arguing that the human subject is divided, fragmented, and irrational (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008).

Scholars Stephen Frosh and Lisa Baraitser (2008) contend that debates surrounding psychosocial subjectivity, “constituted in and through social formations”, have rendered it an “ill-defined entity” (pp. 349-350). These debates primarily surround the question of whether the psychological and social components of subjectivity should be clearly demarcated, and if not, how a “place of suture” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 348) between the two components should be theorized. This has resulted in the lack of a clearly marked object of study for psychosocial studies, and has put it at risk of being reincorporated into more “conventional and 'foundational' disciplines” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 350) from which it has emerged.

For this reason, Frosh and Baraitser (2008) argue that psychosocial studies must also focus upon the critical practice of reflexivity. To be reflexive is to constantly question and remain critical of one's own knowledge, embracing negation as a way to breakdown boundaries and easy assumptions (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). The practice of remaining critical extends to psychosocial studies' understanding of subjectivity, in that scholars must resist the simplistic dichotomies between what is psychological and what is social. Thus, psychosocial studies must adapt new approaches to assessing subjectivity that are “neither 'psycho' nor 'social', and [are] definitely not both, but ... something else again” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 350).

Psychoanalysis and Lacanian Discourse Analysis

Among the influential texts in psychosocial studies, few are more seminal than *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity* by Julian Henriques, Cathy Urwin, Wendy Hollway, Couze Benn and Valerie Walkerdine (1998). *Changing the Subject* uses discursive methods, drawing on innovations from critical social theory, to re-evaluate the theory of subjectivity that “mainstream psychology” (Hollway, 2011, p. 210) assumed in its quantitative and experimental studies. Hollway (2011) identifies two themes in *Changing the Subject* that now concern psychosocial studies: first, the problematic assumption in cognitive psychological methods that human beings are unitary rational subjects, and second, that a strict dichotomization of the individual and society, inner and the outer forces shaping identity, is precarious.

The focus on discursive methods aided in the revaluation of subjectivity by highlighting both how language is used to construct an individual’s subjectivity, and how socio-cultural institutions restrict language, limiting the expression of subjectivity. Discourses and the subject positions that they construct for individuals became the main objects of study (Branney, 2008, p. 575). *Changing the Subject*, in specific, is concerned with Foucault’s theory of discourses and its implications for psychology. Analyzing the discipline of psychology as a discourse, composed of a complex network of power relations and discursive positions, illuminates the ways in which culture regulates individuals using a series of theories and practices (Hollway, 2011). The use of discursive methods allows the researcher to investigate questions of identity, not exclusively in terms of an individual’s personality, but rather in terms of the larger the socio-political forces shaping individuals’ divided subjectivities negotiated in language.

The rejection of the rational subject of cognitive psychology demands an alternative

understanding of the psyche in order to understand how individuals become invested in the subject positions they take up. For Hollway, beginning in the 1980's and culminating with *Doing Qualitative Research Differently: Free Association, Narrative and the Interview Method* (2000) co-authored by Tony Jefferson, and others the solution lies in psychology's reintegration of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, as an interpretive strategy, grants psychosocial studies an account of the psychological processes behind why individuals become invested in specific—often disadvantageous—subject positions through the analysis of conscious and unconscious reasoning (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Psychoanalysis also provides psychosocial studies with a theory of subjectivity that can incorporate both the psychological components of identity, while still taking seriously the constitutive social forces of language and discourse (Georgaca, 2005).

In psychoanalysis, individuals' unconscious and conscious motivations for investment into specific discursive subject positions are rooted in the subject's biographical history. This escapes the deterministic view of language as imposing itself on a blank subjectivity, respecting the subject's personal experience, while still respecting the social construction of identity (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009). Thus, psychoanalysis provides an account of subjectivity that respects social constructionist insights into identity, simultaneously allowing for theorizing about subjective agency, despite its lack of conscious and rational control (Georgaca, 2005).

Psychoanalytic theoretical constructs such as identification and projection account for the way that social forces—the “out-there”—become internalized—the “in-here” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 347). The reintegration of psychoanalysis, therefore, provides psychosocial theorists a method for considering the psychological components of subjectivity construction, while still examining the way this subjectivity is constituted socially (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Saville

Young & Frosh, 2009).

Eugenie Georgaca (2005) notes that the integration of psychoanalysis into psychosocial studies, despite its historical reputation as an oppressive expert system of knowledge enforcing power hierarchies, is compatible with the discipline's social constructionist methodology (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hollway, 2011). Georgaca (2005) argues that psychoanalysis has aided in the deconstruction of subjectivity in "western, individualist, unitary and rational ... psychology" (p. 76), replacing it with the irrational, divided, and paradoxical psychoanalytic subject.

Psychoanalysis has also aided psychosocial studies in addressing the problem of subjective continuity, as psychoanalysis provides an account of the predictability of subjects' actions via repetitive unconscious investment in specific subject positions (Georgaca, 2005). Lastly, Georgaca (2005) argues that psychoanalysis addresses both the possibility of change in discursive positions, and subjects' resistance to change. This is advantageous for psychosocial studies, as a reliance on social construction makes change difficult to theorize and social determinism easy to slip into. Psychoanalysis presents an interpretive strategy that addresses "resistance ... beyond the conscious, rational subject" to account for the "failure of consciousness-raising" (Georgaca, 2005, p. 76) efforts that discount unconscious dynamics.

The use of psychoanalysis has spurred a number of debates, however, in regards to the kind of psychoanalysis that is to be utilized in psychosocial studies. Psychosocial scholars have largely drawn on either Kleinian—referring to the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, innovator of object-relations theory—or Lacanian—referring to the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan—theory (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Frosh and Baraitser (2008) have made the distinction between the aims of these two approaches based on their methods of *making sense* of a subject's

discourse. Kleinian psychoanalytic interpretive approaches analyze a subject's discourse in order to make narrative sense of their unconscious lives, while Lacanian psychoanalytic interpretive approaches attempt to examine a subject's discourse so as to disrupt and deconstruct the ways that subjects make sense of their lives, denying the existence of an individual's personal mental unconscious (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hollway & Jefferson, 2005; Saville Young & Frosh, 2009).

As Frosh (2007) states, the subject of these debates can be characterized by a desire to maintain the dialectic between fragmenting and integrating the subjective experience. Debates in psychosocial studies surrounding sense-making and the inherent interiority or exteriority of the unconscious point back to the struggle over the theorization of an equally psychological and social subjectivity. Both psychoanalytic interpretive approaches attempt to respect psychosocial studies' integration of the social and the psychological. However, the act of either making sense of or disrupting sense in a subject's talk depends on how internal or external these subjective domains are.

The Kleinian interpretive approach chooses to leave the social and psychological spheres of agency distinct, while simultaneously examining how the two are irreducible to one another, in order to study how the subject's internal and external worlds have an effect on one another (Hoggett, 2008). Psychoanalysis, for Kleinians, is used as an interpretive strategy to better understand the unconscious anxieties of the subject's internal world. The Lacanian interpretive approach, on the other hand, attempts to collapse the internal and the external to show that they are indivisible. Frosh and Baraitser (2008) use the Lacanian metaphor of the Möbius strip—where the “inside and the outside flow together as one” (p. 349)—to argue that there is no

distinct psychic sphere in the subject. For Lacanians, the unconscious does not reside in an internal space influenced by social forces, but instead, following Lacan, the unconscious is located in language and is indistinguishable from it. These differences in approach to the psychosocial subject have resulted in two different orthographic representations to match the different conceptions: Kleinian theorists often hyphenate the 'psycho-social', symbolizing the psychological and social's irreducibility to one another, while Lacanians often compound the two words—'psychosocial'—in order to signify that internal and external worlds run together (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hoggett, 2008).

Hollway and Jefferson (2005) exemplify the Kleinian approach to psychosocial studies in their article "Panic and perjury: A psychosocial exploration of agency." Their aim is to develop a theory of social psychological agency that incorporates unconscious psychological conflict, [partially determined by discursive subject positions], that can account for a subject's mysterious illness (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005). The subject in question is a man named Vince, who explains through a series of interviews with Hollway (2005) that he has been on sick leave with an illness that has no "organic evidence" (p. 152) from a job that causes him a great deal of stress. Vince's identity as an honest person, family man, and breadwinner is related both to his biographical history (Vince loves his mother and was neglected by his father) and the social discourses that he is positioned in as a working class male in 1980's England.

Hollway and Jefferson (2005) determine that Vince's illness is derived from the unconscious conflicts he experiences when asked to commit perjury at his place of employment—a job which he needs in order to support his family, but simultaneously causes him an extreme amount of exhaustion and stress. Based upon the empirically derived interview

material, Hollway and Jefferson (2005) conclude that the interlocking forces of unconscious psychic conflicts—as a result of work stress and committing a crime on the job—along with the social and discursive factors that position him as an honest hardworking family man, have made Vince unconsciously choose illness to escape his situation. Hollway and Jefferson's (2005) conclusion is based on their interpretation of a “psychosocial” (p. 147) account of agency and subjectivity.

What Hollway and Jefferson (2005) call the psychosocial subject is an individual who is both situated in “social realities” (pp. 147-149), simultaneously regulated by social discourses, and divided by psychic unconscious conflicts. The discourses that surround the subject provide myriad positions to occupy, while, through the process of *investment*, the internal unconscious of the subject influences which positions they choose to occupy (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005). Investments are conditioned both by the biographical history of the subject, as well as the subject's social surroundings—thus, investment represents a more reliable construct than choice, as it escapes the implication of a rational decision. Investment, as a theoretical construction, attempts to transcend psychological and social dualism by explaining unconscious dynamics through social discourses.

Hollway and Jefferson (2005) theorize the psychoanalytic investment evidenced in Vince's interview transcripts as a conflict within his identity, conditioned by unconscious internal anxieties, influenced by social forces, and unresolvable through willful and conscious action. Taking into account the subject's personal psychic unconscious both allows for a different interpretation of choice in the empirical data and displays the privilege that Hollway and Jefferson give to the importance of the subject's internal psyche. The subject's process of

meaning making, for Hollway and Jefferson (2005), is mediated largely through “psychic dynamics”, which depend on an individual’s biography and social experiences filtered through “intra- and inter-psychic” (p. 150) defenses.

Hollway and Jefferson's (2005) psychosocial subjectivity is neither a reflection of outer discourse, nor rational or “cognitively driven” (p. 150), but one that must be interpreted psychoanalytically. This prioritizes the practice of reflexivity which carries with it two important considerations. The first is the larger context of the subject's life and the way that this colors interpretation; the second is an awareness of counter-transference between analyst and subject. Hollway and Jefferson's (2005) counter-transference requires a comparison of the analysts' impressions of Vince into a “triangulation” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005, p. 150). Triangulation, Hollway and Jefferson (2005) claim, is a method that takes into account the “effect of research relationship(s) on the production and analysis of data” (p. 151).

Hollway and Jefferson’s (2005) method of reflexivity focuses on the “unconscious intersubjectivity” (p. 151) of a research situation in order to better understand the psychic conflicts of the defended subject. Both scholars stress the separation of the text and the subject who produced the text, in order to theorize in regards to the “intra- and inter-psychic processes as well as discursive positioning” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005, p. 151). For Hollway and Jefferson, their conceptualization of the psychosocial subject evades discursive determinism despite the emphasis they place on the subject's internal psychic processes.

Hollway and Jefferson (2005) use these internal psychic processes to “make sense” (p. 151) of the subject’s anxieties and fears, so as to explain Vince’s choice to become ill. As Frosh and Baraitser (2008) note, the assumption that there is a “permanent, real unconscious” (p. 355)

behind the text is characteristic of the Kleinian analytic paradigm in psychosocial studies.

Kleinian interpretive approaches represent an optimism that understands the “ambivalent extremes” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 355) of a split subject’s behavior as manageable, where the analyst interprets a pattern of otherwise meaningless activity into a meaningful narrative.

Partially in response to Hollway and Jefferson’s Kleinian method, Frosh and Baraitser (2008) have published an article entitled “Psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies” surveying how psychoanalysis is employed by psychosocial scholars, centering on conceptions of reflexivity in research. The text provides a critique of the sense-making strategies utilized in Kleinian psychoanalytic psychosocial studies, advocating for a revaluation of reflexivity that doesn’t separate the psychological from the social. Frosh and Baraitser’s (2008) conceptualization of psychosocial subjectivity instead advocates for a Lacanian model that attempts to disrupt sense rather than construct a narrative account.

A Lacanian examination of how a subject is represented in discourse requires an attention to “the letter” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 355), or the play of signifiers—basic units of language, or the sound image component of a sign—in a text. The meaning of signifiers is constantly indeterminate, as a signifier never inherently embodies a specific meaning. This draws attention to the way that meaning is constantly suspended in language, as the speaker can always assign signifiers different meanings—or signifieds. The emphasis on the play of signifiers in Lacanian interpretive approaches intends, therefore, to examine how meaning is constructed in speaker's discourse through the arrangement of signifiers.

This requires the understanding that the sense of a subject’s narrative is made *post-hoc* by the analyst; a practice that is rooted in the analyst’s desire to smooth out and order the text by

identifying its “anchor points” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 355), fixing its meaning. The analyst fixes meaning by locating significance in the “repetition of certain signifiers or metaphorical substitutes in their function as quilting points” (Parker, 2005, p. 170) in a subject’s discourse.

Lacanian psychosocial interpretation seeks to identify the signifiers in a subject’s discourse that do not make sense. These *nonsensical signifiers* fully embody the play of signifiers by representing multiple different, and even paradoxical, meanings to the point of meaninglessness (Parker, 2005). Nonsensical signifiers are, thus, over-determined and “evacuated of content” (Parker, 2010, p. 161). Lacanian interpretive approaches seek to expose the subject to these “irreducible, traumatic, non-meaning[s]” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 356) that plague their discourse and structure their subjectivity.

Frosh and Baraitser (2008) characterize this practice as a sort of meta-analysis, as sense is disrupted in order to analyze the processes by which sense the subject uses sense-making strategies in their discourse. Interpretation is instead cast as “interruption” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 356), as the flow of signifiers in a subject’s discourse is deconstructed rather than constructed into a narrative that makes sense.

The subjectivity and method of psychodiscursive analysis that Frosh and Baraitser advocate for requires a radical reinterpretation of the unconscious along Lacanian psychoanalytic terms. The unconscious, instead of residing in the head of the subject as source of unconscious conflicts, is constituted in the discourse between the analyst and analysand (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 356). The unconscious as seated in the subject’s discourse implies that it too can be understood in terms of a structured system of signifiers and differences, invoking the Lacanian injunction that the unconscious is structured like a language.

Lacanian conceptions of the psychosocial subject entail a caution associated with the act of interpretation, as Frosh and Baraitser (2008) note that the analyst should always be aware of the desire to make sense. Sense making inevitably falls back on heuristics that categorize subjects according to a psychoanalytic expert knowledge—a tactic that is explicitly avoided in critical social psychology—fixing the meaning of their utterances (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Frosh and Baraitser (2008) associate their form of psychodiscursive analysis with the analytic, as opposed to therapeutic, stance in psychoanalysis, as the analytic elements of psychoanalysis attempt to “oppose the normativeness ... in assumptions around individualism ... and care”, opening up alternative possibilities of thought that are usually excluded by “too definite an interpretive stance” (p. 357).

Frosh and Baraitser suggest, borrowing from Parker's (2005) work in Lacanian discourse analysis, that one should approach a subject's discourse as something that should be opened up, not something that can be understood. Thus, for Frosh and Baraitser (2008), the subject's unconscious can't be explained by pushing on to it a “pre-existing grid” that identifies a “defended subject” (p. 358) and its anxieties. When a text is opened up, the connections between signifiers that can be differentiated one from another and the oppositions that structure the subject's identity are made clearer (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 358).

Frosh and Baraitser also critique Hollway and Jefferson's the practice of triangulating as a method of reflexivity. Hollway and Jefferson's use of counter-transference, taking into account their own feelings about Vince as a subject, fails to account for their motivations and desires for wanting to make sense of Vince in the first place (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). This method of reflexivity confuses psychoanalytic conceptions of countertransference with traditional notions

of reflexivity in the social sciences.

Frosh and Baraitser (2008) suggest that Hollway and Jefferson's method of reflexivity hints at typical problematic deployments of psychoanalytic theory in psychosocial studies. Psychoanalysis and countertransference are used as a "technology" to better make sense of Vince, resembling uses of psychoanalysis as an "expert system of knowledge" (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 363). This, Frosh and Baraitser (2008) argue, is the result of an application of Kleinian psychoanalytic theory, which views the "truth of the subject" (p. 363)—the unconscious meaning—as something that can be uncovered by an analyst who possesses a superior knowledge. For Lacanians, this is problematic, as this assumes a fictitious understanding of the truth of the subject's desire as understandable from the outside, and extricable from the desire of the analyst.

Frosh and Baraitser (2008) conclude that psychoanalysis devolves into a normative practice when reflexivity is utilized to better understand a subject, as this threatens to reconstitute the internal and external dichotomy that psychosocial studies attempts to dissolve. Psychosocial studies posits that the social and discursive are inextricable from the psychological; however, the method of reflexivity utilized by Hollway and Jefferson attempts to make sense of a subject by mining a private unconscious subjective economy that is only artificially demarcated from the social (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Frosh and Baraitser (2008) argue that psychoanalytic reflexivity, following its Lacanian incarnations, should instead function disruptively to acknowledge how the unconscious and psychosocial phenomena are constructed in language through the discourse of the analyst and analysand.

Frosh's (2007) critique of the Kleinian interpretive program in psychosocial studies is

further expounded in his article “Disintegrating qualitative research.” Frosh argues that qualitative research in psychology tends to fall too far on the side of the psychological in the process of narrativizing the subject. While this practice can be emancipatory, especially in the sense that it can offer a voice to the voiceless, it ignores insights from social construction, post-structuralism, and psychoanalysis arguing that the human subject is divided between “partial drives, [and] social discourses that frame ... experience, [in] ways of being that are contradictory and reflect ... allegiances of power” (Frosh, 2007, p. 638). Psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, in specific, decenter human subjectivity by exposing how the subject is never whole, and that traditional rational agency is a fallacy (Frosh, 2007).

Frosh (2007) is sympathetic, however, to the need of a maintaining a dialectic between holistic accounts that respect subjective experience, epistemology, and morality, while still understanding the subject as positioned by competing discourses. Frosh's (2007) tentative solution for qualitative research posits a multiplicity of narratives in the “over-determined subject” (p. 639). A subject that is over-determined is one that is constructed in social discourses, while the language that constructs these discourses can never fully represent reality (Frosh, 2007).

In language, some things just can not be said. Some narratives are always excluded from an account that attempts to capture the “multifarious, uncertain and complex” (Frosh, 2007, p. 641) nature of human subjectivity. The inability of language to express all narratives follows from a Lacanian psychoanalytic insight that understands language as producing “gaps and difference” (Frosh, 2007, p. 641; Saville Young & Frosh, 2010, p. 515)—as language can never fully express desire, and inevitably results in the alienation and division the subject. Thus,

language as a method of articulating one's ontology and desire, with its rules and syntactic structures, limits human expression while producing multiple conflicting identities (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010).

This conception of human subjectivity calls into question Kleinian psychosocial interpretive approaches that analyze a singular meaning in defenses and anxieties that lie "underneath" (Frosh, 2007, p. 643) the subject's narrative account. Kleinian psychosocial analysis, Frosh (2007) argues, is "individualizing, essentializing, pathologizing and disempowering" (p. 643) in the way that it imposes psychoanalysis as an expert knowledge on the subject. This is problematic in the way that it fixes the meaning of a subject's ontology, risking the dissolution of "the polymorphous tendencies that upset claims to truth and ... the ... marginality of a resistive subject" (Frosh, 2007, p. 643).

Frosh instead advocates for the integration of Lacanian discourse analysis, a method developed by Parker (2005), into qualitative research to respect the over-determined subject. In particular, Frosh (2007) draws on Parker's suggestion to approach a subject's discourse as something out of which the analyst cannot make narrative sense. The text should be analyzed as something that can be opened up, exposing the subject's multiple and polymorphous narratives (Frosh, 2007). Exploring multiple narratives and resisting the narrativizing sense-making practices that reduce subjectivity to single account is what Frosh (2007) refers to as *disrupting* the text.

This "disrupting and disorganizing" (pp. 644-645) method of analyzing subjectivity is employed by Frosh (2007) alongside a critical narrative analysis of textual material, culminating in a method of qualitative research that examines the multiple narrative structures of a subject's

discourse. A similar, yet more developed and coherent, psychosocial methodology is employed by Frosh in the 2010 article co-written with Lisa Saville Young entitled “‘And where were your brothers in all this?’: A psychosocial approach to texts on brothering.” Saville Young and Frosh (2010) perform a psychosocial analysis of interview material with a British man named Brett in order to examine the construction of masculinity through a description of the act of brothering in the subject’s discourse.

Saville Young and Frosh (2010) advocate for a Lacanian psychosocial interpretive approach in their analysis of fraternal relations, defining their analytic methodology as “concentric reflexivity” (p. 517). Concentric reflexivity is a psychosocial method of reflexivity that focuses on the interplay between the analyst and research subject in constructing the text (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010). Concentric reflexivity frames the analytic process of interviewing, fieldwork, and textual interpretation as composed of different layers, all influenced by the analyst’s own “subjectification in language” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010, p. 518). Saville Young and Frosh (2010) draw upon a Lacanian, as opposed to Kleinian, psychoanalytic conception of investment in discursive subject positions, requiring concentric reflexivity to stay attuned to both the social structures that condition investment, as well as the dynamics of early parental and sibling relationships.

Saville Young and Frosh (2010) argue that what is specifically Lacanian in concentric reflexivity is the emphasis on the “multiplicity and polyvocality of the text” (p. 519). The subject’s discourse is read in way that encourages an opening up of multiple interpretations, respecting the ever-moving play of signifiers, in order to emphasize how language’s “absences and incoherencies” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010, p. 519) articulate the researcher and the

subject. Neither the narrative structure nor discursive subject positions alone represent subjectivity in the text. Rather it is the interplay of these “concentric circles” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010, p. 519) that constructs both the subjectivity of the researcher and subject collectively in the discourse.

Saville Young and Frosh (2010) stress that, despite using psychoanalysis in their methodology, they resist the “lure of sense-making” that constructs a “narrative wholeness” (p. 527), and instead emphasize the incompleteness and fragmentary nature of the subject. “Forcing narrative wholeness”, Saville Young and Frosh (2010) argue, “is a way of doing an injustice” as it dictates the life of a “vulnerable” subject from a “researcher knows best” (pp. 527-528) position. Saville Young and Frosh (2010) instead advocate for the interruptedness and incompleteness of narrative to show how, through “the play of signifiers” in the subject's discourse, a set of procedures can examine the way that the “subject-in-fragments” (p. 528) uses and is used by discourses to articulate their polyvalent identity. The method of incompleteness emphasizes that the center of knowledge lies neither in the subject, nor in the researcher, but instead demonstrates how “a very specific set of desires” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010, p. 528) appear in the discourse and influence it in a fragmented fashion.

Both Saville Young and Frosh are influenced heavily by the work of Parker (1997, 2005) in the development of their theories of subjectivity and psychodiscursive methodologies. Two of Parker's texts that are drawn upon most often by psychosocial theorists are “Discourse analysis and psycho-analysis” (1997) and “Lacanian discourse analysis in psychology: Seven theoretical elements” (2005). The former develops a theory of psychoanalytic subjectivity called *complex subjectivity* that can be incorporated into discourse analysis, examining how cultural

understandings of psychoanalysis are transmitted in discourses, while the latter lays out seven useful insights from Lacanian psychoanalysis that can be applied to work in psychosocial discourse analysis.

Utilizing the theory of complex subjectivity developed in “Discourse analysis and psychoanalysis” (1997), Parker's (2005) article “Lacanian discourse analysis in psychology: Seven theoretical elements” explores different conceptions of discourse in Lacan's work in order to adopt specific elements for the analysis of discourse in psychology. Parker (2005) argues that adopting Lacan's work into psychology demands both a specific method of reading Lacan and a complete revaluation of one's understanding of subjectivity. Parker (2005) reasons that this is due in part to Lacan's concern primarily with the speech of the analysand—not just any text, written or spoken—and Lacan's “hostility” (p. 164) to the goals, theories, and methods of the discipline of psychology. For this reason, a simple appropriation of Lacan into psychology must be resisted and a more careful examination of Lacan's understanding of subjectivity and discourse is required (Parker, 2005).

Parker's approach to examining Lacan's potential contributions to discourse analysis in psychology is prefaced with four components for reading Lacanian theory. These four components can be summarized as follows: first, each interpretation of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is also a reframing and “motivated reconstruction” for the purposes of the analysis at hand; second, scholarly resources that attempt to engage and develop psychoanalysis are more worth attending to than those texts that hastily apply Lacanian theory; third, the discourse analyst will necessarily provide a “motivated distortion of concepts” (Parker, 2005, pp. 165-166) when applying Lacanian psychoanalytic therapy outside of a clinical setting; and last, the kind of

Lacanian approach utilized in discourse analysis will have to be modified depending on the kind of text under analysis.

Every interpretation and application of Lacan's theory outside of a clinical setting is simultaneously a reinterpretation that exhibits a distorted effect, an inevitable result of appropriating Lacan for the purposes of discourse analysis in psychology (Parker, 2005). Each appropriation seeks to mold Lacan's writings for specific purposes, restructuring his theories in such a way that they may suit both the analysis and genre (Parker, 2005). Parker (2005) also states that Lacan never provides a “coherent delimited theory” of discourse or “a method that would be applied to texts”, which he views as “anathema to Lacanian psychoanalysis” (p. 167). Any discourse analysis—including the analysis performed in this thesis—exhibits, a molding and rereading of Lacanian theory, in the same way that Parker's (2005) explication of the seven theoretical elements of Lacanian discourse analysis are composed of a “reading [that] is also a rewriting of scattered comments” (p. 166), providing a motivated reinterpretation of Lacan's psychoanalytic theory.

The motivations behind one's reinterpretation demands a reflexivity—similar to Frosh and Baraitser's (2008) and Saville Young and Frosh's (2010)—that takes into consideration the psychosocial dynamics of how subjectivity is formed between the analyst and analysand. Parker (2005) advocates a method of reflexivity that analyzes the political investments and suppositions of the discourse analyst, not simply the “sum total of the personal investments” (2010, p. 168) they have in the subject under examination. A basic method of reflexivity based upon countertransference and personal investments only psychologizes the subject, ignoring the social, political, theoretical, and institutional investments the analyst and analysand possess that may

influence the analysis (Parker, 2005, 2010).

I use Parker's (2005) seven theoretical elements in this thesis to act as theoretical reinforcement in locating discursive elements in my discourse analysis, and to demonstrate how the Colonel embodies the divided and fragmented subject articulated by Lacanian psychodiscursive scholarship. I treat the subjectivity of the Colonel as socially negotiated through language, regarding the psychological and social components of his subjectivity as inseparable from one another (Frosh and Baraitser, 2008). I also regard the Colonel's subjectivity as split between the truth of his desire and his inability to articulate it, creating a discourse structured by disagreement and conflicting narratives.

I seek to maintain this split subjectivity by not fixing or reducing the Colonel's experience to a singular internal psychological conflict. I instead disrupt, disorganize, and deconstruct the Colonel's method of sense-making in order to understand his discourse as polyvalent and composed of a plurality of narratives, while also examining how his narrative meaning is composed out of chains of signifiers (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Saville Young & Frosh, 2009, 2010). The method of disruption allows me to conceptualize the Colonel's subjectivity as over-determined by a plurality of both conscious and unconscious subject positions simultaneously. This respects his subjectivity as polyvalent in order to avoid approaching the discourse as something that can be understood by determining the hidden meanings beneath the divided subject's conscious awareness (Frosh, 2007). The Colonel's discourse should instead be analyzed as something that can be opened up, with its irreducible non-signifying elements analyzed as structuring his discourse and subjectivity (Parker, 2005).

Methodology

The following section, in providing the methodological framework for my psychodiscursive analysis of the interview transcripts between the Colonel and Haaken from *MIND ZONE: Therapists Behind the Front Lines*, proceeds in two steps. First, I unpack specific Lacanian psychoanalytic terminology, theoretical constructs borrowed from critical theory, and Lacan's theory of the four discourses to provide a background for their employment in both Bracher and Parker's work. The theoretical constructs I explicate include: Imaginary, Symbolic and Real orders, desire, the big Other, master signifier, metaphor and metonymy, interpellation, the discourse of the Master, the discourse of the Hysteric, and the discourse of the Analyst. Second, I examine the two texts from which my psychodiscursive analysis borrows its theoretical foundation and methodology. I begin by exploring Bracher's (1995) three logical steps, in *Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change: A Psychoanalytic Cultural Criticism*, for analyzing desire and identification in the interpellation of subjects. I then explicate 14 of the 21 aspects, borrowed from Parker's 2010 article "Psychosocial studies: Lacanian discourse analysis negotiating interview text", of Parker's (2005) seven theoretical elements for performing Lacanian discourse analysis, developed in "Lacanian Discourse Analysis in Psychology: Seven Theoretical Elements". I utilize these aspects of Parker's (2005) theoretical elements in the identification of Lacanian discursive elements in the interview transcripts (Bracher's second step.)

Lacan and Lacanian Terminology

For Lacan, all human experience can be represented in one of three realms—or orders—that compose a model central to his thought (Evans, 1996). The three orders, the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real, comprise a tripartite structure of the human psyche that characterizes a subject's intrapsychic phenomena, allowing the analyst to delineate between the heterogeneous aspects of human experience (Evans, 1996). Bracher notes that the three orders can be understood in terms of their different relations to language. The Imaginary can be distinguished by its exclusive focus on the preverbal, cognitive capacities that a child uses before its acquisition of language. The Symbolic is equivalent to language itself structuring how human subjectivity interacts with signifiers. The Real is the post-verbal aspect of subjectivity, making up elements of human experience that cannot be expressed linguistically (Bracher, 1995).

The Imaginary order for Lacan is the realm of the psyche that comprises the ego and is the order that encompasses pre-linguistic sense perception and human phenomenological experience. The Imaginary order, as first formulated by Lacan (1982) in “The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience” is the intrapsychic realm in which the human subject, as an infant, assumes or identifies with an image outside of itself. Lacan (1982) calls this pre-linguistic identification with an outside image the ‘mirror phase’ and argues that the identification provides for the child a sense of unity and coherence that constitutes the child’s ego (Homer, 2005).

This sense of unity is due to the child's identification with an outside image of a whole human body that, in turn, grants it a sense of wholeness by comparison. The primary identification constituting the child’s ego upon entrance into the Imaginary order is, however, an

illusion, as the child's body is in actuality immature and "fragmented" (Lacan, 1982, p. 4). This fragmentation is due to the child's premature birth in comparison to other mammals, resulting in "motor incapacity and nursling dependence" (Lacan, 1982, p. 2). The child's fragmented self contrasts with the outside image with which they is identifying, forging a discontinuity between the outside image and the child's body. Imaginary identification thus creates a disharmony in the foundation of the child's ego—establishing a lack that is fundamental to one's subjectivity (Lacan, 1982). The realm of the Imaginary, therefore, is one of illusory coherence founded primarily on misrecognition.

While the Imaginary order is concerned with images, the Symbolic order is the realm of linguistic communication. Human beings enter into the Symbolic order at the moment of language acquisition, and are at once subjected to the laws that structure language. Both human subjectivity and the unconscious are structured by the laws of the Symbolic, comprised of signifiers and the system of differences that organize them (Evans, 1996).

The Real is that which resists any kind of representation symbolically or through images. The Real is what underlies and supports the Symbolic system that comprises the subject's social reality, while simultaneously undermining and placing a limit to it. The Real is often associated with the *objet petit a*. One can conceptualize the Real as a void at the center of our subjectivity, connected to the lack, established upon entry into the Imaginary order, that one always desires impossibly to fill (Homer, 2005). The *objet petit a* is the positive representation or symbolization of this lack in the form of a hole in the network of signifiers. The *objet petit a* is at once a hole and also the 'object cause' of one's desire, which masks over the hole. The *objet petit a* is, therefore, a left-over of the Real; an object that is a stand-in for the lack resulting from

the process of symbolically representing desire, which can never be fully represented (Homer, 2005; Žižek, 1989/2009).

Both the Symbolic and the Real orders are of the highest importance for this psychodiscursive analysis primarily because the Symbolic order of signifiers that structure any discourse, and the Real that provides a limit to it, comprise a subject's intersubjective cultural environment. Lacanian psychodiscursive scholars have also, however, emphasized the necessity of analyzing discourse from the position of the Symbolic and the Real so as to avoid fixing the subjectivity of individuals in a disempowering and restricting fashion (Frosh, 2007). Parker's (2005) insight, for example, that a Lacanian approach to discourse analysis should focus on “deadlocks of perspective” (p. 175), or the disagreements and contrasting positions that constitute the structure of a discourse, is primarily an analysis of the Symbolic order. Tracing the 'line of the Symbolic' in a discourse analysis, which analyzes the text to identify differences and disagreements, is, for Parker (2005), a necessary approach to a discourse. An analysis from the line of the Symbolic opposes an analysis from the 'line of the Imaginary' which lapses into the development of a coherent and complete—yet illusory, following the Imaginary order identification—account of a subject's conscious and unconscious psychology from an erroneous “expert position” (Parker, 2005, p. 175) of knowledge.²

² The primacy of the Symbolic order is echoed elsewhere in the work of scholars engaging with Lacan in both critical social psychology and philosophy. David Pavón Cuéllar's *From the Conscious Interior to an Exterior Unconscious* (2010), for example, argues that an analysis of discourse from the line of the Imaginary will only result in an attempt to draw “vague similarities” between individual's thoughts, while an analysis of the Symbolic order exposes “rigorously analyzable identities” (p. 1) and the differences present between the Symbolic elements of discourse. A discourse's Imaginary elements (mental images evoked through signifiers in the discourse) only reflect the significations in the head of the analyst, not the subject whose discourse is being analyzed. This is due to the fact that the Imaginary order consists of the images and significations that are evoked through signifiers in language, which are unique to the individual who is experiencing them. These significations are contrasted with the linguistic signifiers that are part of the discursive content in the Symbolic order, which are the same for everyone (Pavón Cuéllar, 2010, pp. 2-3). Therefore, an analysis of Imaginary order desire will only serve to provide a picture of the

The Symbolic network of signifiers structuring a cultural discourse, and the Real that provides its limit also have a determinative role in the desire of the subject (Evans, 1996). The concept of *desire*, as it is used here is described by Lacan (1977/1998) as the “essence of man” (p. 275) and defined by Dylan Evan's (1996) in the *Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis* as an unconscious and continuous force at the heart of human existence. Desire is not a longing for a specific object, but rather the desire for something that is always missing—the lack. Lacanian desire is described fundamentally as “the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1977/1998, p. 235) or, rather, the desire to be object of the big Other's desire.

Lacan describes the Symbolic as a totalizing universe of symbols—roughly equated to culture—that structure a subject's desire (Evans, 1996). Desire is expressed in the Symbolic through combinations of signifiers that are linked together—signifying chains—metaphorically and metonymically (Evans, 1996). Metaphor, for Lacan, is the substitution of one signifier for another—or “the passage of the signifier into the signified, the creation of a new signified” (Evans, 1996, p. 115)—while metonymy is the process by which signifiers are linked to one another or combined, describing how signifiers interact together in a discourse (Evans, 1996). Signifiers in language structure and determine the desire of the subject via metaphor and metonymy because specific signifiers are metaphorically and metonymically linked to other

Imaginary order desire in the head of the researcher, not the subject producing the discourse. Instead of approaching Lacanian discourse analysis from a position that attempts to analyze the Imaginary cognitive content of a subject through their language, Pavón Cuéllar (2010) argues that the focus should be on the “symbolic and its real structure” (p. 8). The “structured real of the symbolic” (p. 8), constitutes all that is left unsaid in discourse, what Pavón Cuéllar (2010) refers to as “the symbolic space” (p. 9) that structures everything. Pavón Cuéllar (2010) places a significant amount of importance on the determining and structuring power of the Symbolic order in discourse, as he states explicitly that the structure of the Symbolic order is “the foundation of reality” (p. 8). The Symbolic both determines what images are present in the Imaginary order, and “carves” (p. 8) a structure in the Real aspects of discourse. The Symbolic aspects of discourse, and the subsequent ‘real of the symbolic’, represent for Pavón Cuéllar (2010) what is analyzable, determining and directly accessible in text, while Imaginary aspects are determined to be a “waste of time” (p. 9).

operative signifiers—just as the words 'strong' or 'big' are linked to the word 'man'—that induce desire (Bracher, 1995). Thus, signifiers influence a subject's desire in different ways depending on how they are linked together circularly and linearly into signifying chains.

The Symbolic also encompasses both the big Other and, for Lacan, the unconscious. The big Other, as a “radical alterity” (Evans, 1996, p. 136), structures the speech of the subject as the subject utters signifiers according to what they perceive as the big Other's desire. Lacan argues that, because a subject's speech is structured by the big Other's desire, when a subject speaks this speech *originates* in the big Other. Lacan identifies the unconscious as located in language and “primarily linguistic” (Evans, 1996, p. 219), this implies that even one's unconscious desires are then structured by the system of linguistic laws that comprise the Symbolic big Other. In this sense, speech is beyond the conscious control of the subject, and therefore the “unconscious is the discourse of the Other” (Lacan, 1982, p. 172).

Slavoj Žižek (2007) defines the big Other as that which is a “subjective presupposition” (p. 10), a force equivalent to an ideological or nationalist cause in which subjects ground their existence. For the subject, the big Other is the ultimate basis and legitimation of meaning; a cause for which the subject would be willing to give their life. However, the big Other is also inscribed in the Symbolic and therefore exists only in the speech, activity, and beliefs of the subject (Žižek, 2007, p. 9). The big Other is that which validates the claims made in the subject's discourse, “guaranteeing [the subject] a subjective position” (Parker, 2005, p. 172).

Whenever a subject makes claims to knowledge, subsequently constructing their *ego ideal*, they are doing so in relation to the big Other. The ego ideal can be defined as an identification on behalf of the big Other—identification with the ideals of the law, or super ego,

not with an image—so as to offer oneself up to the Other as an object of desire (Žižek, 1989/2009). The ego ideal is composed of Symbolic identifications with characteristics that are deemed favorable to the big Other, so that all claims to knowledge become that which are deemed to be valuable to the big Other (Žižek, 2007)

Bracher (2005) utilizes the theoretical constructs of desire and the big Other in his conception of the 'passive' and 'active narcissistic desire of the Symbolic order'. Bracher defines passive narcissistic desire as

the wish that the Symbolic Other - the ultimate authority or source of meaning constituted by the Symbolic order and epitomized in our notions of Nature, Society, God, and so on - loves the subject in some way, that is, values, cares about, recognizes, or even just takes account of the subject. (1993, p. 23)

Contrastingly, Bracher (1993) defines active narcissistic desire as “identification ... [the] desire to identify with the Symbolic Other to the extent of embodying ... signifiers given pride of place in the code constituting this Other ... attempt[ing] to embodying those signifiers ... valued by the Other” (p. 27). The passive narcissistic desire for the big Other's approval is followed by an active narcissistic desire that can be satisfied by identification with specific signifiers (Bracher, 1993).

Through a subject's desire for the love and recognition of the Symbolic big Other, they embody and identify with signifiers that the big Other desires, “enticing subjects to assume a specific position” (Bracher, 1993, p. 23) in discourse. These signifiers represent the subject's '*points de capiton*'. The *points de capiton* are points in a discourse by “which the signifier stops the otherwise endless movement of the signification” (Lacan, 1977/1982, p. 303), binding itself to a subject or a signified. The *points de capiton* act as master signifiers or attributes that make up a fixed meaning in the identity of a subject (Lacan, 1977/1982; Bracher, 1993).

Points de capiton, making up a subject's ego ideal, also represent *master signifiers*, or signifiers that represent the subject for all other signifiers (Evans, 1996). Subjects who assume master signifiers treat them as infallible sources of authority, "they use them as the last word, the bottom line, the term that anchors, explains, or justifies the claims or demands contained in a message" (Bracher, 1993, p. 25). The master signifier weaves other signifiers in a discourse together into a chain, framing them and giving them a specific coherent meaning when assembled together (Žižek, 1989/2009). Bracher (1993) argues that, "[master] signifiers ... give us a sense of substance, significance, and well-being when we manage to ally ourselves with them (or oppose ourselves to them) in the eyes of the Other, satisfying our passive narcissistic Symbolic-order desires" (p. 26).

By embodying master signifiers from ideological cultural forces, supposing this will result in the recognition and love of the big Other, the subject becomes the object of *interpellation*. Interpellation, as it is used in this thesis, corresponds with Althusser's (1971) definition in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"—namely the process by which subjecthood is constituted through ideology. Following Althusser's (1971) assessment of ideology,

the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function ... of 'constituting' 'concrete individuals as subjects. ... I shall then suggest that ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among the individuals ... or 'transforms' the individuals into subjects ... by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation (p. 118).

Therefore, the Symbolic big Other interpellates subjects into embodying master signifiers as anchor points in their identity, appealing to a subject's passive narcissistic desire by way of

cultural phenomenon. These master signifiers operate as infallible authorities, repressing all other interpretations of said signifiers.

Subsequently, those subjects that embody ideological master signifiers are enticed into a discursive position that Lacan identifies as the *discourse of the Master*. As Bracher (1997) notes, “the discourse of the master promotes consciousness, synthesis ... and self-equivalence ... by instituting the dominance of master signifiers (S_1), which order knowledge (S_2) according to their own values and keep fantasy ... in a subordinate and repressed position” (p. 117). This position has the subject speaking from a place of dominance and tyranny that represses all other signified meanings that do not correspond to the dominant signification of the master signifier (Bracher, 1997). The discourse of the Master is most utilized by political and cultural phenomenon that attempt to suppress resistance and revolution, influencing social life through the imposition of “master signifiers that guide the larger social and political agendas of our society” (Bracher, 1997, p. 119).

The discourse of the Master is one of the four fundamental structures of discourse in Lacan’s (1991/2006) theory of the four discourses. Bracher (1993) utilizes the four discourses in *Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change* to develop a brand of cultural criticism that is suitable for theorizing ethical and effective social change through a subject’s production of their own master signifiers, as opposed to the imposition of ideological master signifiers. For Bracher (1993), the value of Lacan’s theory of the four discourses lies in its emphasis on the role discourse plays in individual subjective psychological changes, and the consequent effects these changes have on a larger social scale.³ Lacan postulates that discourse functions as a structuring force “subsist[ing]

³ Bracher (1997) argues that the reason discourse is so forceful in determining social order is because it appeals to the subject’s interests, connecting discourse with identity and enjoyment. Bracher’s emphasis, however, on the power

in certain fundamental relations” (Bracher, 1997, p. 107), both psychological and social, that govern the way subjectivity is constituted. Bracher’s understanding of this fundamental link between changes in individuals’ ‘psychic economies’ and changes in greater societal structures is derived from the 1969 seminar—*The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*— in which Lacan (1991/2006) posits “what dominates society is the practice of language” (p. 107).

In formulating his theory of discourse around four fundamental structures, Lacan attempted to account for four basic social phenomena, namely “educating, governing, desiring and protesting, and transforming or revolutionizing” (Bracher, 1997, p. 107). For Lacan, discourse “exercises force in the social order” (Bracher, 1997, p. 108) through the appeal to individuals’ subjective desires, while simultaneously constituting subjects’ identity, desire and sense of being. Thus, “all determination”—or the function of discourse to form one’s ontology, identity, and desire—“of the subject, and therefore of thought, depends on discourse” (Lacan, 1991/2006, p. 152). For Lacan, discourse is fundamental in the determination of subjectivity, so “it is only logical that a change in discourse can produce changes in ... psychological and social realities” (Bracher, 1997, p. 108). Lacan’s theory of discourse utilizes a structural model in an attempt to express how these changes come about through an analysis of social bonds between individuals in discourse (Verhaeghe, 1995).

The four fundamental structures of discourse, and the effects evoked by these discourses, are derived from Lacan’s schematic of four discourse positions.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \underline{\text{Agent}} & \rightarrow & \underline{\text{Other}} \\ \text{Truth} & \leftarrow & \text{Product} \end{array}$$

of discourse in evoking social change reveals a particularly idealist approach to the problem of ideology. For a materialist approach to the critique of ideology, see Žižek (1989/2009).

The left-hand side of the schemata represents the speaking subject in discourse and the receiving other in discourse is represented on the right-hand side. The positions of 'agent' and 'other' represent the manifest content in discourse, while the bottom positions of 'truth' and 'product' represent the latent or repressed content. The top left is reserved for the 'agent'—speaker who plays the active role in discourse—addressing the 'other'—the receiver of the discourse—and is activated by the psychological factor in the agent position. The position at bottom left represents the desire, or hidden truth, that drives the speaker, connecting them within the signifying chain. Lastly, the position at the bottom right of the schemata represents the effect of a discourse on the receiver.

Each of the positions in the schemata above can be occupied by four “psychological functions” (Bracher, 1997, p. 108). The four fundamental psychological functions include 'knowledge' (S_2), master signifiers (S_1), 'self-division' ($\$$) and the *petit objet a*. The psychological functions occur in a fixed relationship with one another and rotate clockwise in the above positions. Depending on the factor that occupies the speaking agent, different effects are produced in each of the four discourses, resulting in four particular social bonds and four basic social phenomena (Verhaeghe, 1995). Educating occurs through the discourse of the University (S_2 in agent position), governing through the discourse of the Master (S_1 in agent position), protesting through the discourse of the Hysteric ($\$$ as agent), and revolutionizing through the discourse of the Analyst (a as agent).

The subject's positioning in discourse establishes their specific identity and *jouissance* as speakers, eliciting particular social and psychological effects. (Bracher, 1997) *Jouissance*, as both Bracher and Lacan use it, refers to the enjoyment that one seeks when one transcends the

pleasure principle. The pleasure principle, for Lacan, is a Symbolic injunction to 'enjoy as little as possible', or to maintain homeostasis in the subject that is disrupted by excess pleasure in *jouissance*. *Jouissance* is denied fundamentally when the subject enters the Symbolic order of language, through the castration complex—i.e. a renunciation of the attempt to be the object of the mother's desire (Evans, 1996). Bracher associates one's *jouissance* with one's existence, corresponding to individuals' mental and physical well-being.

In Bracher's (1993) *Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change*, political-rhetorical discourse embodies the discourse of the Master when the agent speaks from the position of the master signifier. One can identify a master signifier, and the agent who speaks from the discourse of the Master, by the way the agent and the other respond to the message (Bracher, 1997, p. 112). An agent uses a master signifier to justify the claims that they make, as the master signifier represents “the last word, the bottom line, the term that anchors, explains, or justifies” (Bracher, 1997, p. 112). The other in the discourse of the Master acts similarly to the authority of the master signifier, not offering a challenge to its authority but accepting it blindly as having value. When an agent speaks with the authority of a master signifier the psychological functions in Lacan's model are ordered accordingly:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \underline{S_1} & \rightarrow & \underline{S_2} \\ \$ & & a \end{array}$$

When the subject in agent position speaks from the discourse of the Master, the power exerted through the master signifier (S_1) forces the other to understand the message and to grant the signifier with the full power of explanation and authority. The other, as receiver of the message, opens themselves up to knowledge, establishing a system of beliefs that attempts to incorporate the master signifier, while also granting the master signifier authority over all other signifiers in

the system (S_2). Through the dictation of the authority of the master signifier on the system of knowledge, objectifying the other, the master also dictates the desire of the other, thus producing and repressing the excess of enjoyment (a) along with the repression of the master's own divided subjectivity. Bracher notes that in facing one's divided subjectivity ($\$$), the agent would experience anxiety, the loss of meaning and identity, as well as a desire that cannot be satisfied (1997).

The agent instead wholeheartedly identifies with a master signifier as a source of identity, to repress their divided subjectivity and promulgate the illusion that they are an undivided and whole subject. This cause of desire in the repressed position is unattainable to the agent and results in castration, or the agent's impossibility of accessing their *jouissance*. Thus, the agent speaking from the position of the discourse of the Master suppresses the cause of desire both within themselves and the other, denying the other a voice and the “legitimation of his or her own subjectivity” (Bracher, 1993, p. 64).

From a political perspective, the discourse of the Master is characteristic of speech that asserts tyrannical and dominant ideologies, locking down discourse and asserting meaning through totalizing rhetoric (Bracher, 1993). The discourse of the Master is the Symbolic arm of political and totalitarian phenomena, as ideological interpellation operates by way of forcing master signifiers upon others. The discourse of the Master linguistically imperializes meaning by shutting down progressive and revolutionary alternative rhetoric from surfacing in the system of knowledge. Meaning is imperialized in a discourse through the imposition of master signifiers on the subject, suppressing the subject's evocation of their own master signifiers corresponding to their repressed desires—the *objet petit a* which holds “the power of revolution”

(Bracher, 1993, p. 64).

The goal of Bracher's (1993) cultural criticism is to move a subject from the ideologically interpellated position of the discourse of the Master to the *discourse of the Analyst* so as to generate new master signifiers that promote social change. Bracher (1993) argues that, one must attack the inconsistencies in the big Other—or “the lack in its relation to the cause of desire” (p. 65)—exposing the ideological impetus behind master signifiers, to create transformations in the social order. The interrogation of the big Other's lack, however, often takes the form of the *discourse of the Hysteric* first before moving to the discourse of the Analyst:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \$ & \rightarrow & \underline{S}_1 \\ a & & S_2 \end{array}$$

When the subject speaks from the discourse of the Hysteric, the dominant agentic position is occupied by the psychological function of divided subjectivity (\$). Divided subjectivity is representative of the subject's alienation from their desire upon entering the Symbolic order. The discourse of the Hysteric exemplifies a subject who is resistant to satisfaction offered by the embodiment of society and culture's master signifiers (Bracher, 1993).

The discourse of the Hysteric often characterizes discourses of complaint, resistance, and protest, and is beneficial in the way that it confronts systems of knowledge and master signifiers with the experience of the marginalized subject (Bracher, 1993). Its inadequacy for achieving social change lies, however, in its dependency on receiving a master signifier from the other instead of producing one for itself (Bracher, 1993).⁴ For this reason, alienation persists for

⁴ Hysteria and hysterical neurosis, for Lacan, is a structural position—the discourse of the Hysteric characteristic of the subject's refusal of society's master signifiers and the division between one's desire and an ideal (Bracher, 1993; Evans, 1996). This division of the subject (\$) that is expressed in hysteria is a direct manifestation of the alienation that one experiences in language acquisition and the subject's integration into the Symbolic order

subjects speaking from the discourse of the Hysteric.

Only by inducing the subject into the discourse of the Analyst can one overcome the tyranny that is exercised socially and psychologically in language, effectively achieving social change (Bracher, 1993). The discourse of the Analyst forces the subject to come to terms with their own alienation and desire by placing the *a*—the repressed desire and truth of the subject—into the dominant agentic position. The discourse of the Analyst requires the subject to “recognize, acknowledge, and deal with this excluded portion of being, to the extent of producing a new master signifier (S_1) in response to it” (Bracher, 1993, p. 68).

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \underline{a} & \rightarrow & \underline{\$} \\ S_2 & & S_1 \end{array}$$

Bracher argues that, in Lacanian psychoanalytic clinical practice, the analyst identifies the patient's problem as resulting from a conflict between the analysand's present identity, as conferred master signifiers they have embodied, and their unconscious desire for *jouissance*—the *a* (Bracher, 1993). The goal of a successful analysis is, therefore, to divorce the subject from their present identity, eventually facilitating an acknowledgment and identification with their repressed desire.

Bringing the subject to occupy the discourse of the Analyst, and consequently breaking the identifications that constitute an ideologically interpellated subjectivity, follows two steps: alienation and separation (Bracher, 1993). The analyst first identifies the master signifiers that

(Bracher, 1993). Master signifiers, or society's ideals, are products of the Symbolic and exclude aspects of the subject's desire, resulting in the hysteric's search for an object that will close this division. In Lacan's theory of discourse, the master signifier—“a secure meaning that will overcome anxiety” (Bracher, 1993, p. 67)—is positioned on the right side of the structure, implying that master signifiers are located outside the subject, ostensibly in other cultural artifacts or discourses. The hysteric remains alienated because they search for an object in the form of other master signifiers, failing to search within themselves for an object that corresponds to their desire suppressed by society's master signifiers (Bracher, 1993).

are causing the alienating identifications in the subject and then engages in the process of separating the subject from the master signifiers. The two steps together are designed to repeal the subject's ideological identifications in any of Lacan's three orders by moving through the four structures of discourse (Bracher, 1993).

Lastly, a successful end to an analysis requires what Lacan and Bracher (1993) call “traversing the fantasy” (p. 72), or the separation from identification with the *objet petit a* of the big Other. This final separation requires that the subject recognize the big Other's deficiency by realizing that:

the unconscious fantasies that have been directing one's desire and contributing to one's suffering are both relative and doomed to remain unfulfilled ... that there is no transcendental meaning to be found in one's existence, no ultimate object that will satisfy one's desire, and no single, fundamental jouissance that will of itself make life worth living (Bracher, 1995, p. 72).

Thus, the analysis concludes when the subject, who now recognizes and speaks from the position of their own desire (the *a*), produces a new master signifier, altering their ego ideal with new values and a new identity, accommodating the once repressed desire into their fantasy (Bracher, 1993).

While this process doesn't free the subject from the influence of master signifiers, it produces a new master signifier that the subject produces according to the truth of their desire (Bracher, 1993). This circular, “rather than progressive”, process produces a less oppressive signifier that is “less absolute, exclusive, and rigid in its establishment of the subject's identity” (Bracher, 1995, pp. 72-73), breaking hold of ideological interpellation by inducing subjects to shed their identification with the master signifiers that have interpellated them. Thus, the discourse of the Analyst induces social change by breaking ideological interpellation first by

altering the sense of identity in the subject through a recognition of how the ideological discourse alienates them from their desire, and then eventually moving the subject towards a recognition of the lack in the ideological discourse with which they once identified (Bracher, 1993).

Three steps in Mark Bracher's *Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change: A Psychoanalytic Cultural Criticism*

The methodology I utilize in my analysis of subjectivity construction in ideological interpellation is borrowed from Bracher's (1993) methodology of the three logical steps developed in *Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change: A Psychoanalytic Cultural Criticism*. These steps use desire as a theoretical tool to draw attention to the identifications in a (textual) piece of cultural phenomenon. The desires that are evoked in the Symbolic order identifications are utilized by Bracher (1993) to account for how subjects become ideologically interpellated in cultural phenomena. Through the use of the three logical steps, Bracher's methodology induces the discourse of the Analyst in the subject in order to bring about social change. The discourse of the Analyst is induced by first identifying the evocation of a subject's passive and active narcissistic desire in the Symbolic and Real orders—which positions the subject in the discourse of the Master—with the aim of exposing unconscious desires evoked by ideological interpellation.

Following Lacan's insights on desire, namely, that an individual's desire is the desire of the Other, Bracher (1993) argues that cultural phenomena both evoke and promise satisfaction of subject's desires through interpellation, “summoning them to assume a certain subjective (dis)position” (p. 19). Bracher (1993) draws on Sigmund Freud's (1914) seminal essay “On

Narcissism” to develop his conceptions of passive narcissistic and active narcissistic desire utilized in the interpretation of subjects' interpellation (p. 19-20). Narcissistic desire—the desire to *be*—corresponds to a subject’s love and identification; passive desire is the desire to be the object of the big Other's desire, while active desire is the desire to become the big Other via identification with those who have acquired the big Other's love (Bracher, 1995; Freud, 1957). Passive and active narcissistic desire are evoked in all three of Lacan’s orders, Imaginary, Symbolic and Real. Depending on what form of desire is evoked in one’s subjective economy, the subject is interpellated into one of Lacan’s four structures of discourse, eliciting specific cultural and societal effects.

The three logical steps of Bracher's (1993) methodology are as follows: first, one must identify the “manifest, collective, subjective effect produced ... by a cultural artifact or discourse” (p. 74). This corresponds to the first part of Bracher’s (1993) strategy of cultural criticism, namely “to map the fundamental identifications (and the concomitant desires) that are promoted ... by the cultural phenomenon in question, thus emphasizing in the critic’s readers the alienation entailed by these identifications” (p. 74). This step will explicate two central questions and disagreements that play a major role in both guiding and thematizing the discourse between Haaken and the Colonel: what is the content of the Colonel's identity and the ideal collective military identity maintained by military behavioral health personnel—evidenced through representative signifiers—that he as an interpellated subject constructs in the discourse? Additionally, what is the content of the military behavioral health mission, and is the nature of the mission inherently singular—as the Colonel advocates—or is it, as Haaken suggests, dualistic?

In order to perform a successful culturally critical interpretation, the critic must assess “readings” (Bracher, 1993, p. 74) of a text, rather than the text itself. For the purposes of this thesis, one should interpret the Colonel’s interview transcription as a reading of the larger discourse on military behavioral health. Consequently, the Colonel can be seen as positioned within this discourse, occupying the discourse of the Master, while simultaneously producing a reading of this larger ‘text’ through the interview transcripts. In so far as the Colonel’s discourse can be seen as a reading of a larger discourse on military behavioral health, this thesis makes appropriate use of Bracher’s (1993) methodology by interpreting a particular reading, and subsequently questioning the discourse’s larger societal implications.

Second, one must locate the “elements of discourse” (Bracher, 1993, p. 75) that are responsible for effects assessed in steps one and three. The elements of discourse to be identified are the specific signifiers that constitute the desire and *jouissance* of the subject (Bracher, 1993). The purpose of this step is to locate signifiers that satisfy the desires in the Symbolic and Real orders and subsequently solidify the ego ideal in the discourse’s audience (Bracher, 1993). The subject’s ego ideal is composed of signifiers that compose an ideal identity according to an internalized representation of the big Other as the law. To aid in the completion of this step of Bracher’s methodology, 14 of the 21 aspects of Parker’s (2005) seven theoretical elements borrowed from his 2010 article “Psychosocial studies: Lacanian discourse analysis negotiating interview text.” Parker’s elements aid the analysis in identifying specific signifiers—elements in discourse—that represent Lacanian theoretical formulations, including: master signifiers (S_1), *points de capiton*, the big Other, and the *objet petit a*.

The third and final step will be to identify the “non-manifest collective subjective

factors” that constitute the ego ideal corresponding to the discursive elements in step two, producing the “manifest effects” (Bracher, 1995, p. 76). Bracher (1993) suggests that this step should be followed simultaneously with the second step, as the “particular desires and specific contents of [the] ... ego ideal (Symbolic)” (p. 76) correspond to the discursive elements identified in the second step. For the purposes of this thesis, however, these two steps will be demarcated into two separate sections.

The analysis of the interview transcripts according to these three steps culminates in an examination of the operation of passive and active narcissistic desire in the text via two Symbolic order functions as identified by Bracher (1993). First, the Colonel's identification with the phallic signifier grants the feeling of autonomy and self-sufficiency in the subject. Second, the incitement of the *vel of alienation* in the subject that dictates one should choose between identity granted through the phallic signifier or being (*jouissance*). Once the interview transcripts have been examined through the employment of this methodology and the desires that are evoked through the discursive practices have been exposed, subjectivity construction in ideological interpellation can be critiqued.

Performing this analysis using Bracher's (1993) three logical steps produces a critique by inducing the discourse of the Analyst in the reader, which promotes social change by altering the subject's sense of identity. The position of the discourse of the Analyst induces the subject to produce new master signifiers, outside of ideological interpellation, that correspond to the desires formerly suppressed by the abandoned their master signifiers (Bracher, 1993). The subject reconfigures their identity through a recognition of how the ideological discourse they once identified with alienated their desire, and through a recognition of the lack in the ideological

discourse with which they once identified.

By exposing the failure of the master signifiers with which the Colonel identifies, and by which he is interpellated, this analysis speaks from the discourse of the Analyst. Bracher (1993) maintains that this procedure offers a more ethical approach than Marxist or deconstructive criticism because psychological change—and, in turn, larger societal change—occurs without demanding or even suggesting change in the analysand. Psychoanalytic criticism, as envisioned by Bracher (1993), is effective both because it is self-directed by the subject and because it produces new values in accordance with the repressed desires of the subject without forcing them to involuntarily abandon their fantasies.

Ian Parker's Lacanian Discourse Analysis in Psychology: Seven Theoretical Elements

By employing Bracher's (1993) second step of Lacanian psychoanalytic cultural criticism, this thesis will utilize 14 of the 21 aspects of Parker's (2005, 2010) seven theoretical elements from "Psychosocial studies: Lacanian discourse analysis negotiating interview text." My use of Parker's theory supplies psychodiscursive methodological support for the location of Lacanian discursive elements in Bracher's second logical step, and shows how the Colonel's discourse demonstrates a fragmented and divided subjectivity. The seven theoretical elements, and their 21 aspects, posited by Parker attempt to organize "seven key elements of the psychoanalytic work of Jacques Lacan that have a direct bearing on the development of theory for discourse analysis in psychology and implications for discourse analytic reading of text" (2005, p. 163). The theoretical elements utilized in this thesis are as follows: "formal qualities of text", "anchoring of representation", "agency and determination", "the role of knowledge", "positions in language",

and “deadlocks in perspective” (2005, p. 163). The 14 aspects utilized in this analysis are selected for their utility in identifying the signifiers—elements in discourse—representing master signifiers (S_1), *points de capiton*, the big Other, and the *objet petit a*.

Formal Qualities of Text. Identifying the formal qualities of a text emphasizes Lacan's analysis of discourse by examining the way the text's structure is composed of a network of signifiers, not a network of signified meanings. The two aspects examined in this theoretical element are the emphasis of 'form over content' and the identification of 'nonsensical signifiers' (Parker, 2010).

Lacanian discourse analysis draws attention to the form, or structure, of a text over its content so as to treat language, following de Saussure (1959), as a system of differences, where signifiers are differentiated by their syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, placing the signifiers in opposition to one another. Reading a discourse as composed of a system of differences without positive relations, is what Lacan (1977/1998) defines as 'obtaining absolute difference'. Absolute difference stresses “patterns and connections between signifiers, as connections that differentiate them from each other and hold them in tension” (Parker, 1995, p. 168), rather than connections among signified meanings woven together to create a coherent narrative.

Certain signifiers in a subject's discourse are “irreducible, traumatic, non-meaning” (p. 168) despite Parker (2005) and Lacan's insistence that a text is composed of a network of a signifiers. These signifiers are traumatic in the Lacanian sense, in that they are overdetermined with paradoxical meanings and unable to be integrated into the Symbolic network without a remainder of the Real emerging as a leftover. A successful end to a Lacanian discourse analysis

results in identifying and exposing to the analysand these “signifying elements” (Lacan 1977/1998, p. 250; Parker, 2005, p. 168) made up of non-meanings. Parker (2010) postulates that these nonsensical signifying elements are capable of representing subjects simply because they do not have a determinate meaning, and that the role of Lacanian discourse analysis is to “specify ... the role these nonsensical elements play in organizing the text” (2005, p. 168).

Anchoring of Representation. Further delineation of a text’s formal structure is the subject of Parker’s (2005) second theoretical element entitled, ‘anchoring of representation’. Two aspects utilized in this thesis are the identification of ‘quilting points’, and ‘positions of mastery’ in the text (Parker, 2010).

‘Quilting points’—or the *points de capiton*—are signifiers that “keep the fabric of the signifying system in place” aiding the analyst in identifying “the way certain signifiers or metaphorical substitutes recur in a text” (Parker, 2005, p. 169). These signifiers are points that make up fixed meaning in the identity of a subject, identifiable through repetition and metaphor, representing “points around which a text, a discourse or a life is organized” (Parker, 2010, p. 161).

These points also act as master signifiers, structurally repressing other signified meanings through the subject’s insistence that “‘this is the way things are’, that it is not subject to challenge or dissent” (Parker, 2005, p. 170). Parker (2005) argues that speakers who adopt these signifiers (the position of S_1 or the discourse of the Master) “claim ... authority that is maintained through repetition of the claim rather than reasoned argument” (p. 170). To identify these signifiers, Parker (2005) instructs the analyst to locate the points in a text where “a facade of reason

argument breaks down” (p. 170). Asserting authority in a text, and consequently repressing alternative significations through the uttering of master signifiers, is a position of mastery taken by the discursive subject when one identifies with specific signifiers.

Agency and Determination. Within the third of Parker’s (2005) seven theoretical elements, he calls for a reconsideration of subjectivity that does not assume “who we are as thinking feeling individuals is separate from our relation to others or the medium through which we are connected with them” (2010, p. 163). This reformulation demands a reworking of the classic dichotomy of what is considered to lay “‘inside’ and what lies ‘outside’ discourse” (Parker, 2005, p. 171) so that an analyst can better understand the linkages between the constitution of individuals’ subjectivity and language. The three aspects of Parker’s third theoretical element utilized in this thesis include the “difference between the Imaginary and the Symbolic” orders, “the discourse of the Other” and the “*objet petit a*” (Parker, 2010, pp. 163-164).

The difference between the Imaginary and the Symbolic orders in discourse provides Parker (2005) a way of analyzing how two subjects can communicate, while simultaneously holding antagonistic positions in relation to one another. Within the Imaginary order, two subjects (both subjects are therapists, for example) can seemingly communicate and understand one another. The two subjects, when analyzing the discourse according to its Symbolic order operations, can, nevertheless, be positioned in a structurally asymmetrical fashion (one subject may be black, while the other is white; one subject may be a man, while the other is woman). Thus, sensitivity to the power dynamics that yield Symbolic social order asymmetries, despite

the seemingly Imaginary symmetries, is an essential practice for the analysis of discourse.

These Symbolic order operations resulting from power differentials are, however, often not made explicit and operate behind Imaginary order coherence between subjects. Parker (2005) characterizes elements of a discourse which are not spoken about—Symbolic asymmetries—the “gaps and ‘holes’ where what is said at any moment presupposes that something else cannot or will not be said” (p. 171), the ‘discourse of the Other’. The discourse of the Other translates into Lacan's conception of the unconscious as located intersubjectively in language, emerging when the subject enters into the Symbolic order, not within the interiority of the subject's mind. In order to locate the Lacanian unconscious discursively, Parker (2010) encourages the analyst to examine the repressed material in a subject's discourse that is unmentioned and “shut out in a repeatable, reiterated process of exclusion” (p. 164).

The third aspect of this theoretical element, the *objet petit a*, functions as an unnamed “object cause of the dialogue” as “something indefinable and fascinating which we suppose in an analysis to be a 'cause' around which a speaker circles” (Parker, 2010, p. 165; 2005, p. 171). More than a specific word in the analyzed discourse, the *objet petit a* is a theoretical tool that defines what is driving communication between the two subjects. The *objet petit a* can also be used to “trace patterns in discourse” (Parker, 2005, p. 172), as it is a shared object cause of desire that both subjects seek. The unconscious—discourse of the Other—and the *objet petit a* are, however, both composed within discourse, not “inside the subject”, and for this reason “they are relevant theoretical concepts for discourse analysis” (Parker, 2005, p. 172).

The Role of Knowledge. The fourth theoretical element in Parker's (2005) framework builds off of the third by examining the role knowledge in subjectivity construction. The subject's "system of language" that "operates above and beyond" (Parker, 2005, p. 172) discourse always frames the discursive subject in relation to the big Other. Two aspects of this theoretical element that can be utilized in order to identify the role of knowledge and the big Other include an analysis of "a relation to knowledge" and the "discourse of the hysteric" (Parker, 2010, pp. 164-165).

Parker (2005) instructs the analyst "to trace the points in the text where knowledge is presumed" (p. 172) in order to locate the big Other in discourse. Parker (2005) argues that an individual subject's ego ideal, through the imputation of knowledge, is always in relation to the big Other, which operates in the Symbolic order, validating subjects' structural positions within the social. By locating the speaker's supposition of knowledge the analyst can identify where authority and power lies, providing an answer to Lacan's oft-repeated question 'What does the Other want of me?' (Parker, 2005, p. 173).

Parker, like Bracher, draws on Lacan's theory of discourse in order to attend to these structural relations underlying subjects' discourse. The discourse of the Hysteric, for instance, which positions the speaker as the lacking 'agent' (\$), motivated by an urge (the *objet petit a*) challenging the other (S_1) as producer of knowledge (S_2), provides the analyst with a way to characterize resistance and the questioning of authority in discourse (Parker, 2005). The hysteric, as one who is denied, or "barred from" (Parker, 2010, p. 165), knowledge challenges the authority figure as one who possesses the master signifier. The subject in the position of the discourse of the Hysteric resists by questioning the authority figure possessing the master

signifier (Parker, 2010). Speaking from the agential position of lacking 'agent'—or divided subject—characterizes the subject's alienation from their desire upon entering the Symbolic order of the law, exemplifying one who is resistant to the satisfaction of embodying society's master signifiers (Bracher, 1993). A Lacanian discourse analysis sensitive to differences in structural positions and resistance to authority demands, therefore, as Parker (2005) notes, “an analysis of the ‘political’ projects and suppositions” (p. 173) present in the text.

Positions in Language. Parker’s (2005) fifth element focuses on speaking as an act which positions subjects and forges social relationships between the subject and the other. When subjects speak, they establish discourses that structure them in relation to the other, producing the effects articulated in Lacan’s theory of discourse. This thesis incorporates two aspects of this Lacanian theoretical element to examine the role of subject positioning by showing that “no metalanguage can be spoken”, and by demonstrating the difference between the “subject of statement and subject of enunciation” (Parker, 2010, p. 166).

What is meant by *metalanguage* is a point from outside the text that can be utilized to dictate truth about the subject whose discourse is under analysis (Parker, 2005). Both Parker (2010) and Lacan dictate that the analyst cannot take a “god’s-eye view” (p. 166) of the subject’s speech as the analyst, too, speaks from a position within language in relation to the subject being analyzed. To speak metalinguistically entails that the analyst would “lie outside the existing chains of signification” (Parker, 2005, p. 174) and outside Lacan’s four discursive positions. The discourse analyst should, therefore, not attempt to produce an account of the underlying psychological causes of the analysand’s discourse—the line of the Imaginary—“drawing on

other information about them to fill in the gaps” (Parker, 2005, p. 174), but instead attend to the gaps and chains of signifiers that structure the text.

Lacan’s dichotomy between the subject of a *statement* and subject of *enunciation* serves to differentiate between the “facts” or “statements” that constitute the identity of any discursive subject (the 'I' signifier, for example, is an indexical shifter that can represent any subject who articulates it) and the actual act of speaking which “opens up a dimension of truth” (Parker, 2010, p. 166). Lacan's separation of a statement from the subject's enunciation privileges the subject’s production of language as the location of the discursive unconscious, over the interpreted content (“the array of characters and positions that constitute a text” as “an abstract system of signs”) (Parker, 2005, p. 174) of a subject’s discourse (Evans, 1996). The speech of the enunciating subject represents this truth because it “is closer to the enigmatic truth of the subject’s desire” (also called “full speech” or “true speech”) (Evans, 1996, p. 194). Enunciation, through the recognition of the enunciating subject, is valuable to a Lacanian discourse analysis as it identifies the truth of the subject in the speaker and the location of the unconscious in the Symbolic.

Deadlocks of Perspective. Parker's (2005) sixth theoretical element pertains to a desirable disagreement between the analyst and the analysand. Attaining disagreement is desirable, for both Lacan (1977/1998) and Parker, because it establishes absolute difference. The pursuit of identifying deadlocks of perspective, rather than contiguity and agreement, reworks classic research criteria in discourse analysis as disagreement entails establishing discontinuities instead of a coherent understanding of the text as whole (Parker, 2005). Two aspects of this

element utilized in this thesis are 'no agreement' between the analyst and the analysand, and the linkage between feminization and perspective deadlocks in 'sexual difference' (Parker, 2010).

Parker (2010) notes that disagreement between the analyst and the subject in a discourse is necessary in that it articulates the “deadlocks that structure the text” (p. 167), allowing the discourse to function—as disagreement and the failings of language, for Lacan, is what fuels human communication. Striving for absolute difference between analyst and analysand is derived from Lacanian psychoanalytic therapy, where the analyst’s desire is for the analysand to recognize the truth in regards to their unconscious desire; a truth that is absolutely different than the desire of the analysand (Evans, 1996). In so far as the analyst and analysand possess different desires in regards to their differing discursive positions, agreement between the two would amount to “an analytic failure to keep to ‘the line of the Symbolic’” and would “indicate the operation of ‘the line of the Imaginary’” (Parker, 2005, p. 175).

Lacan’s argument that 'there’s no such thing as a sexual relationship'—sexual difference—is an attempt to encapsulate absolute difference in discursive positions that feminized or masculinized subjects occupy; however, Parker (2010) notes that this difference can, and should, also be seen as a “profoundly ideological” (p. 167) opposition. Feminization and masculinization of subjects, as structural positions, becomes especially pertinent in regards to the discourse of the Hysteric. Parker (2010) notes specifically that there are consequences associated with the hysterical position in discourse, as the hysteric has been characterized stereotypically as a feminine position. This has profound ideological consequences due to the Symbolic asymmetries—and corresponding power inequalities—associated with the way masculine and feminine subject positions intersect within patriarchal society (Parker, 2010).

Analysis

Bracher's First Logical Step – the Manifest, Collective, Subjective Effect: The Interviews Between the Colonel and Haaken

I begin the first part of my analysis by identifying the transcripts' "manifest, collective, subjective effect" (Bracher, 1993, p. 74) in order to trace the identifications and desires promoted by the Colonel's discourse. Here, I explicate two central disagreements that guide Haaken and the Colonel's discourse. The first question surrounds the Colonel's identity and the collective military identity he constructs for behavioral health personnel as an interpellated subject in his interview with Haaken. The second question surrounds the content of the mission for military behavioral health personnel and whether it possesses a singular—as the Colonel advocates—or, as Haaken suggests, dualistic character.

The Colonel and Haaken's first interview begins with the Colonel outlining what composes his identity as both a military therapist and soldier, on the one hand, and a civilian therapist on the other. The Colonel attempts to delineate between the two by stressing the differences that characterize the mission for the civilian therapist and the mission for the military behavioral therapist. The Colonel constructs a binary opposition between 'civilian' and 'military', as he constructs the military therapist as one that follows a specific set of values or a "soldier's creed."

Yeah, but it's not a job. It's not. Trust me. It's a way of life. And I think if clinicians can get that, that will help them a lot. Civilians. This is not a job. This is a way of life. I mean I really believe in what I do ... We don't discuss the political ramifications and all that. That's not what we sign up (for). What we're signing up for is the mission of being a soldier, or being a Marine or being an airman. That's what we focus on. And for many it's not a job (Colonel, personal communication, May, 21, 2011).

The military therapeutic profession is characterized as one that requires both a devotion to a way

of life—a system of values and beliefs—as well as an unwavering devotion to one's mission. The mission is guided by these systems of “bigger values” defined simply by the Colonel as “loyalty, duty, respect” (personal communication, May, 21, 2011). The Colonel states that this system of larger values can be summed up as “the soldier's creed”, which entails “risking your life” and “never giving up” (personal communication, May, 21, 2011) in the process of completing the mission. While the civilian therapeutic profession is defined by the Colonel as a mere “job”, the military approach to behavioral health is a way of living one's life that ties the individual into a larger system of “being a soldier, or being a Marine, or being an airman” that is “not a job” (personal communication, May, 21, 2011), but rather separated by an adherence to a mission.

The concept of a mission for the Colonel that supports the dyad between civilian and military takes different forms at different points in the discourse. Definitions of the content of the mission range from near circular explanations (“The primary mission that service members have is to complete the mission. It is to complete the mission, regardless” (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011) to more refined explanations that utilize Army-specific terminology. The Colonel most often emphasizes that the term force multiplier defines the mission of a military behavioral health professional. The concept of a force multiplier entails “keep[ing] the soldier in the fight ... sustaining soldiers ... by doing ... medically or behavioral health ... help[ing] the commanders add to the mission by keeping their soldiers that normally or typically could be taken out of the fight” (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011). The Colonel compliments this definition of the mission by adding that his “job is to bring energy into the fight ... to bring support, relief. To bring calm. To bring peace. To bring peace of mind to

this war effort” (personal communication, July 9, 2011). What emerges is a chain of signifiers surrounding the mission that entail a devotion to using behavioral and medical techniques to help soldiers withstand inexorably traumatic and violent events, keeping them in theaters of war by managing their stress.

Yet another facet of the mission that supports this demarcation between 'civilian' and 'soldier' is the concept of sacrifice. The Colonel characterizes sacrifice as something that the soldier is both asked to make and must make, implying a choice that is dependent on each individual soldier's devotion to the mission. The Colonel states,

There's a sacrifice that we have to make. And the question is, are we willing to make those sacrifices? And it's interesting in that I think the public has this distance there. And you're looking at it from the sideline. ... to go in there thinking, without thinking that you can do it. Or thinking that I'm going to be harmed or I'm going to have casualties. We don't think of- that's not our major issue. Our major issue is we're built to accomplish missions. We are built to accomplish missions. This is what we were charged to do. This is what we will do (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The 'public', as a signifier linked to the signifier 'civilian', is distanced from this notion of sacrifice. The Colonel declares that neither the soldier nor the military behavioral therapist should be concerned with being harmed or becoming a casualty. The soldier must show “resiliency” in the face of “painful” and “difficult” events, and those that can achieve this will “find meaning and purpose” (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011) bestowed through the military identity. This sacrifice is “an experience where people can take it and grow” (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011), becoming an integral part of the military identity only through the practice of resiliency. The Colonel's connection between the signifiers 'sacrifice' and 'resiliency' weaves the two together into the larger chain of signifiers that define the mission in terms of maintaining the soldier's military identity. The notion of sacrifice that the

Colonel posits in relation to the maintenance of a military identity—and an adherence to a mission guided by larger values—becomes the solution to the problem of providing relief to soldier's mental trauma. The maintenance of a military identity for a soldier, despite repeated exposure to combat, is distinctly privileged over withdrawal from combat zones, as the Colonel states: “when you strip that identity from a person who has embraced it you’re doing more harm than good” (personal communication, July 9, 2011). Haaken calls the tenability and the differing purposes of the Colonel's conception of the mission into question, as the goal of providing relief, calm, and peace to the soldier experiencing mental trauma from battle and the goal to serve the purposes of the higher military values—keeping soldiers on the battlefield—are conflicting.

Haaken argues:

[the] mission ... to stay alive and bring my unit back alive ... that’s a different mission than the overall military objective. That becomes a different mission ... The Army’s aim militarily is to seize and hold ground. Now, but then there’s a mental health mission that’s separate from that. So when you talk about the mission, which mission ...

the force multiplier concept worries me, it’s kind of like giving athletes steroids to keep going in the short run. You can keep people pumped up, and you’re a very good coach, and is there a worry about over-exhausting, keeping people with boosters and maybe overlooking when the forces really are worn out (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel contests Haaken's separation of the mental health mission from the overall military objective. He insists that the two missions are one in the same—a singular mission—and that both are achievable.

I wouldn’t say it’s separate. I would say it’s- everything’s connected to everything. You’re not going to seize and hold ground if you have soldiers who are not mentally fit or combat ready. You’re not. So I think it’s all associated and connected to- And that’s why we’re here. If the Army didn’t value behavioral health and keeping their soldiers fit and strong I would not be here (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011).

Haaken, on the other hand, questions whether the mission for military behavioral health

professionals can be collapsed into one. If the two missions have conflicting aims, as the larger military values dictate an unwavering dedication to the mission of seizing and holding ground, than the feasibility of achieving both missions simultaneously is an illusion. The mission of the force multiplier, to keep soldiers in combat regardless of their mental well-being, trumps the mental health mission, leaving only one mission for military behavioral health personnel.

Haaken's contentions emphasize that the singularity of the mission lies not in the collapsibility of the two missions into one, but rather that only one mission—the mission of the force multiplier—is truly operative here. The Colonel challenges this through an appeal to his expertise, further arguing that the binary opposition between 'civilian' and 'military' changes the perspective and the potential understanding of the mission for an outsider.

Our role here as behavioral health providers is totally different than that of a civilian provider in the civilian sector. And so we're coming from it in a different direction. ... We're just looking at two different scenarios. ... I'm totally right in supporting the soldier. I'm totally on target in trying to get them through this difficult period in their lives. Getting them through war. When they come out of war, that's a different scenario. That's something that people like you and people at the VA ... that they're going to have to deal with. But for me, in this place ... my job is to ensure that our soldiers get through what they have to go through (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The manifest subjective effect and driving force of this discourse is centered on the disagreements—deadlocks of perspective—between the Colonel and Haaken, as military therapist and civilian therapist respectively. The Colonel maintains that military behavioral health personnel must accomplish a singular mission as both a force multiplier and a healer by helping soldiers to develop resiliency and alleviate trauma in order to cultivate a military identity centered on sacrifice. Haaken contests the feasibility of this singular mission by differentiating between the mental health mission and the overall military objective, insisting that the latter

mission—the mission of the force multiplier—is incommensurable with the former, yet distinctly privileged.

Bracher's Second Logical Step – Elements of Discourse: Parker's Seven Theoretical Elements

Having analyzed the manifest subjective effects produced by the discourse—disagreements in regards to the identity and status of the mission—the second part of my analysis locates the “elements of discourse” (Bracher, 1993, p. 75) responsible for the manifest and non-manifest subjective effects in the first and third steps, respectively. I utilize 14 of the 21 aspects of Parker’s (2005) seven theoretical elements borrowed from “Psychosocial studies: Lacanian discourse analysis negotiating interview text” (2010) in order to identify signifiers embodying Lacanian theoretical constructs. The elements of discourse I identify include master signifiers (S_1), *points de capiton*, the big Other and the *objet petit a*. This section of my analysis proceeds using each theoretical element as a heading, utilizing the aspects clustered in each element. Specific theoretical elements are grouped together in a single heading to emphasize how their aspects work together in identifying signifiers in the text.

Formal Qualities of Text. Instances of absolute difference between signifiers are apparent throughout the interviews between the Colonel and Haaken. Absolute difference stresses “patterns and connections between signifiers, as connections that differentiate them from each other and hold them in tension” (Parker, 1995, p. 168), not as connections between signified meanings woven together to create a coherent narrative. A coherent narrative creates a unified account, in the line of the Imaginary, serving as the discourse analyst's dictation of truth from a

position of power. Instead, this analysis locates signifiers that are differentiated from one another to outline the formal structure of the discourse.

The most striking instance of absolute difference is the Colonel's distinction between 'civilian' and 'military'. The Colonel invokes the signifier 'civilian', a signifier with which he does not identify and with which he seeks to establish a difference, in contrast to signifiers such as 'military', 'mission', 'soldier', and 'Marine'. The Colonel provides a clear example of this absolute difference when he states, "Our role here as behavioral health providers is totally different than that of a civilian provider in the civilian sector. And so we're coming from it in a different direction ... We're just looking at two different scenarios" (personal communication, July 9, 2011). The Colonel establishes absolute difference when speaking of the 'civilian paradigm' in behavioral health, in contrast to the United States Military's approach to behavioral health (e.g. the practice of Combat Stress Control).

It's part of what we call the soldier's creed. And part of that is never giving up. And part of it is also risking your life. And that I think separates the military from civilian ... I mean the way that civilians look at the military, as far as the psychology of it, is totally ... you may not understand [it] if you're using a civilian paradigm (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel is represented by the signifiers 'soldier's creed', 'military', 'psychology', and 'behavioral health', which are set in opposition to the signifier 'civilian paradigm'.

The absolute difference between the signifiers 'military' and 'civilian' is characterized by the notion of risking your life which is associated with the military, but not with the civilian paradigm. In the first interview with Haaken, the Colonel declares that there is a "cost to freedom" and that "service members" are "willing to risk their lives to pay that cost" (personal communication, May, 21, 2011). The notion of risking one's life for the cost to freedom, a

sacrifice of one's life to the military or the United States for freedom, is an element that further sets the military in opposition to the signifier 'civilian' and the other signifiers associated with it.

Within the Colonel's discourse, absolute difference is also present in the signifier 'mission'. The word mission is invoked so frequently in the Colonel's discourse that, according to Parker's (2010) formulation, it can be considered a nonsensical signifier "reduced to nonmeaning" (p. 161). This is due to what Parker (2005) calls the signifier's "overdetermination" or the multiple and sometimes contradictory "interpretations" of a single signifier, which do not preclude one another, resisting a "fix[ing] and limit[ing] [of] what may be said by the subject" (p. 171).

Throughout the three interviews, the signifier 'mission' is repeated so frequently and given so many "different values ... that it has all but been evacuated of content" (Parker, 2010, p. 161). The Colonel, in the final interview, states that the purpose of the mission is both about winning American wars *and* about taking care of soldiers and service members. When Haaken states that the mission "to stay alive and bring [one's] unit back alive" is different than the larger military mission, the Colonel responds by saying, "The primary mission that service members have is to complete the mission. It is to complete the mission, regardless. Staying alive is part of completing the mission because you can't complete the mission unless you're alive" (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

This overdetermination of the mission is further demonstrated when the Colonel denies the disparity between military behavioral health professionals' mission "to protect the American public's interests, to be an instrument of power", acting as force multipliers, and the mission "to stay alive and bring my unit back alive" (personal communication, July 9, 2011) by keeping

soldiers mentally healthy. The Colonel states, in reference to the mission, “I wouldn’t say it’s separate. I would say it’s- everything’s connected to everything” (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The signifier 'mission' is frequently repeated and invoked, evacuating its meaning in the Colonel's speech, making it an integral part of the structure of the larger discourse. This signifier is of value for this analysis as it represents a signifier of “irreducible, traumatic, non-meaning” that organizes the entire “flow of the text” (Parker, 2005, p. 168). Identifying and exposing the 'mission' as a signifying element that is overdetermined and made up of non-meanings is required in order to produce a successful Lacanian discourse analysis (Lacan, 1977/1998; Parker, 2005). This nonsensical signifying element is capable of representing the Colonel because it lacks a determinate meaning; however, despite this lack, this nonsensical element also organizes the structure of the text (Parker, 2005, 2010).

Anchoring of Representation & Positions in Language. The first aspect of Parker’s (2005) second theoretical element is the identification of quilting points, or *points de capiton*, in the Colonel’s discourse. *Points de capiton* are places in a discourse where “the signifier stops the otherwise endless movement of the signification” (Lacan, 1982, p. 303), binding itself to a subject or a signified. Quilting points make up fixed meanings in the identity of a subject and are detectable through a subject's use of repetition and metaphor, representing “points around which a text, a discourse or a life is organized” (Parker, 2010, p. 161).

The signifiers in the text that compose a fixed meaning in the Colonel’s identity, organizing his life and the discourse, are many of the same signifiers that he associates with the

signifiers 'military' and 'mission'. These include 'sacrifice', 'soldier's creed', 'resiliency', and 'risking one's life'. When Haaken asks what the larger values of the mission are, the Colonel responds with the signifiers, "Loyalty, duty, respect" (personal communication, May, 21, 2011). When questioned in regards to American soldiers killing civilians, the Colonel speaks out strongly against it, appealing to the signifiers 'honor' and 'honorable behavior' revealing them as *points de capiton*.

we have to remind them who they are, that they're a soldier, or a Marine ... because of that, and what we stand for ... there are things we don't do. We do not kill ... innocent civilians ... plunder, pillage ... That's not honorable
(Colonel, personal communication, May, 21, 2011).

Points de capiton, for Lacan, have their source in the function of metaphor (Bracher, 1993).

Metaphor, as the substitution of one signifier for another, occurs when a signification "residing in the [discursive] unconscious" (Bracher, 1993, p. 51)—that which goes unsaid—moves the subject to utter a signifier as the signification's replacement. 'Honor' and 'honorable behavior' are *points de capiton* in that they are metaphors for aspects of the military identity, binding the signifier to the signified and further building the chain of signifiers that compose the Colonel's military identity.

Another important signifier that acts as a quilting point is 'resiliency'. The Colonel identifies with this signifier personally, recalling sayings recited to him by his mother emphasizing the importance of being resilient ("My mom used to say ... 'You will have some difficult days, but keep your head up and keep walking ... That's what we call resiliency. Those are the things—my life is resilient'" (personal communication, May, 21, 2011). The Colonel in numerous other places throughout the discourse repeats this signifier. In reference to the ideal characteristics of soldiers prepared to complete the mission, 'resiliency' is always regarded as

indispensable. For example, when the Colonel reflects on the notion of the ‘strong warrior’, he states:

For me, being in the military, the number one focus is on accomplishing the mission ... Accomplishing the mission takes you some energy, some effort to rebound. I mean you have to shift. You can't have people who are going to get hit and fall apart and not get back up. That's not what we're about. It's about accomplishing a mission and so – is there any other way of doing that, that's better than the resiliency (personal communication, May, 21, 2011)?

The signifiers ‘honor’, ‘resiliency’, and ‘strong warrior’ are connected in the Colonel’s discourse through what Lacan calls metonymic chains, or the linkages between signifiers composing a larger Symbolic network that desire and identification operate within (Bracher, 1993). This Symbolic network is composed of quilting points that fix meaning in the subject’s identity through sheer repetition and linkages to other signifiers.

Curiously, the signifier that most clearly organizes the Colonel’s discourse as a *point de capiton*, while lacking a fixed point of meaning when analyzed across contexts, is the ‘mission’. As a quilting point in the Colonel’s discourse, the ‘mission’ also acts as a master signifier. The insistence of a singular ‘mission’ anchors both the Colonel’s identity and the role of military behavioral health personnel, while treating the ‘mission’ as an infallible source of authority, “the last word, the bottom line, the term that anchors, explains, or justifies the claims or demands contained in a message” (Bracher, 1993, p. 25).

The Colonel’s primary assertion of the definition of ‘mission’ is metaphorically substitutable with the signifier ‘force multiplier’, another quilting point for the Colonel. When asked to define the term ‘force multiplier’, the Colonel states:

Force multiplier is a term that is frequently used to indicate that we enhance the mission ... force multiplier basically means that we can keep the soldier in the fight. ... doing that medically or behavior health we’re able to complete the mission ... we help the

commanders add to the mission by keeping their soldier that normally ... could be taken out of the fight (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

'Mission' and 'force multiplier', as a quilting point, are metaphorically linked; however, through the process of substitution specific aspects of the signified are repressed, "that is, certain metonymic links present in the first signifier are absent from the new, substitute signifier" (Bracher, 1993, p. 51). In substituting 'mission' for 'force multiplier', different signified meanings that would be associated with 'mission' (e.g. Haaken raises the contention that the mission "to stay alive and bring [the] unit back alive" is a different mission) become excluded and repressed, in favor of "keeping ... soldiers that would normally ... be taken out of the fight" (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel's insistence on a particular signification of the signifier 'mission', with its metaphorical substitution for 'force multiplier', places him in a position of mastery, exhibiting what Parker (2005) calls structural repression represented through Lacan's matheme S_1 (particular master signifier 'mission') $\rightarrow S_2$ (signifying system of knowledge comprising multiple meanings of the mission). According to Parker (2005), this formula is representative of the way specific signifiers stand in a "dominant position over the rest of the text" (pp. 169-170), so that they function as quilting points for the larger symbolic system (i.e. the discourse on the role of the therapist).

My utilization of this theoretical element shows that the nonsensical and heavily debated signifier of the 'mission' operates as both a quilting point—*point de capiton*—for the Colonel and as a master signifier when metaphorically linked with 'force multiplier'. The identification of the 'mission' as a master signifier effectively structurally represses other signified meanings of the signifier 'mission' that are not congruous with its metaphorical substitution 'force multiplier'.

Repressing other signified meanings that do not correspond with 'force multiplier' has implications for the larger symbolic system that defines the mission for military behavioral health personnel, as the Colonel, commander of the CSC Detachment, speaks from a position of authority and mastery in regards to the mission, taking up the discourse of the Master.

When the subject speaks from the discourse of the Master, they attempt to justify their authority through the use of a master signifier, as it represents the final word that automatically legitimates their claim (Bracher, 1993). The master signifier (S_1) forces the other to understand the message and to grant the signifier with the full power of explanation and authority. When the other becomes subject to the discourse of the master, they open themselves up to knowledge (S_2), attempting to incorporate the master signifier by granting it authority over their existing belief system. Through the dictation of the authority of the master signifier and the objectification of the other, the master dictates the desire of the other, repressing the *objet petit a* (Bracher, 1997).

The signifiers 'force multiplier', 'military', 'loyalty', 'duty', 'resiliency', 'honor', 'Army values', 'soldier creed', and 'mission' can be identified as quilting points, comprising the Colonel's identity and ego ideal, because he is the speaker, positioned as the subject of enunciation. The discourse of the subject of enunciation comprises "a dimension of truth" (Parker, 2010, p. 166) because it is the location of the subject's discursive unconscious—or full speech (Evans, 1996). The emphasis on full speech, or signifiers with which the enunciating subject identifies, constituting their discursive unconscious, is meant to show that when a subject speaks and defines their identity the source of their speech and identifications are located in the unconscious. This speech is, thus, conditioned by the desire of the big Other, and articulates the truth of the

subject's desire (Evans, 1996; Pavón Cuéllar, 2010).

As an analyst of the Colonel's discourse, I examine his identity as structured by chains of signifiers composed of metaphors and disagreements to avoid speaking from the position of a metalanguage. Speaking metalinguistically implies that one analyzes discourse from a powerful expert account that insists the researcher is the one who knows best in regards to the psychology of the subject. Clinical psychoanalysis that attempts to posit the truth of the subject's desire by speaking metalinguistically is, for Parker (2005), both an analytic and ethical failure that is often carried over into the analysis of discourse.

Positing the truth of the subject presents an analytic failure by refusing to keep to the line of the Symbolic, establishing illusory agreement between the analyst and analysand, and not striving for absolute difference. The analyst's positing of the truth of the subject also represents an ethical failure in that it ignores the differences between the analyst and the analysand's desires. The analyst imperializes the psychology of the analysand when they assume that they can determine the analysand's desire, pinning down the process of signification from an expert position of knowledge, and diagnosing an internal psychology of which they have no true understanding (Parker, 2005; Pavón Cuéllar, 2010).

I avoid speaking from a metalinguistic perspective by abstaining from the production of a coherent underlying psychological diagnosis of the Colonel. This imperializes the Colonel's psychology from a position of the discourse of the Master, incorrectly determining the truth of his desire. Speaking metalinguistically would assume that, as an analyst, I “lie outside the existing chains of signification” (Parker, 2005, p. 174) and outside the discursive positions in Lacan's theory of discourse. Producing an account of the underlying psychological causes of the

Colonel's discourse performs an analysis from the line of the Imaginary “drawing on other information ... to fill in the gaps” (Parker, 2005, p. 174) instead of attending to the gaps and chains of signifiers that structure the text. Attending to the holes in the chains of signifiers opens up the text, delineating its structure by highlighting the gaps and variability of accounts in the discourse.

Agency and Determination. The three aspects of the third theoretical element—the difference between the Symbolic and the Imaginary, the 'discourse of the Other', and the *objet petit a*—aren't individual discursive elements, *per se*. They serve as theoretical tools to identify the repressed features in discourse, as well as the cause around which the discourse circles. Teasing apart the Symbolic and the Imaginary components exposes repressed structural asymmetries between speaking subjects, often cloaked by Imaginary order coherence.

The 'discourse of the Other' in the interview transcripts with the Colonel is that which is covered over, excluded repeatedly and yet still a constituent of the text's structure. Parker (2005) defines the discourse of the Other as the “gaps and holes” where what is said at any moment presupposes that something else cannot or will not be said” (p. 171). The discourse of the Other also translates into the Lacanian conception of the unconscious. The unconscious, for Lacan, is not located within the interiority of the subject's mind but rather through the subject's entrance into the Symbolic order of language. Because speech and language are inherently intersubjective, the Lacanian unconscious is trans-individual. Evans (1996) defines the unconscious as

the effects of the signifier on the subject, in that the signifier is what is repressed and what returns in the formations of the unconscious ... All the references to language,

speech, discourse and signifiers clearly locate the unconscious in the order of the Symbolic. ... The unconscious is the determination of the subject by the symbolic order” (p. 220)

This unconscious for Parker (2010) can, therefore, be conceptualized as that which is “covered over” (p. 164) and repressed in a text, while also provided its inherent structure. The identification of a subject's unconscious—or the discourse of the Other—accords with the focus on the discourse's overall structure.

Where repression is most present in the interviews between the Colonel and Haaken is in regards to the discussions around the signifier of the 'mission', and the negotiations of its signification. In their attempts to negotiate the meaning of the mission for military behavioral health personnel, both Haaken and the Colonel circle around the question of the duality of the signifier's signification; namely, whether the mission to help soldiers suffering traumatic mental health problems by all available means, and the mission to aid the United States military in maintaining a large fighting force—the mission of the force multiplier—can be separated into two opposing missions, and whether one takes precedent over the other. The Colonel doesn't verbally recognize the potential for juxtaposition between the dichotomous meanings of the mission but instead contends that the two aren't separate, and that “everything's connected to everything. You're not going to seize and hold ground if you have soldiers who are not mentally fit or combat ready. You're not. So I think it's all associated” (personal communication, July 9, 2011). Haaken, on the other hand, questions the interconnectedness of these two meanings of the mission, asking the Colonel whether there are actually two conflicting missions. The Colonel, on multiple occasions in the transcript, emphasizes that the meaning of the mission is “to win American fights. It's to win the war” and, as a force multiplier”, to “help the commanders add to

the mission by keeping their soldiers that normally or typically could be taken out of the fight” (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel insists that the mission of the therapist is to be a force multiplier, exhibiting his allegiance to what he calls Army values or the soldier creed. In regards to the soldier creed, Haaken questions the importance of the larger values guiding the military therapists' mission. The Colonel replies to Haaken's inquiry, stating, “You live by 'em. You live by the values. Loyalty, duty, respect” (personal communication, May, 21, 2011). Similarly, the Colonel states elsewhere, in reference to 'Army values' that “[if] you[re] against the values, you're going against what we are about” (personal communication, May, 21, 2011). When questioned in regards to his professional background as a social worker, however, the Colonel appeals to a different value system and a different 'mission'.

I'm a social worker first, before I'm an officer. I was a social worker first and my social work values trumps the military values. Okay? That's how I identify but what I'm saying- the army values are excellent. I live by them. But I also have a professional ethic. I'm licensed. You know, and I have to do the right thing to keep that license. So sometimes there comes some conflict but the majority of the time there doesn't (personal communication, June 9, 2011).

The Colonel states that his values as a social worker—his values as a healer, aiming first and foremost to keep soldiers alive and mentally healthy—trump his military values, despite having vowed allegiance to Army values and the importance of the mission.

This paradoxical account in the Colonel's discourse draws attention to the discourse of the Other in his speech. While the Colonel may contend that “the mission comes first” and that the two missions, of keeping soldiers mentally healthy and maintaining a strong fighting force to “win American fights” (personal communication, June 9, 2011) are the same, he differentiates between his Army values and social worker values, declaring that the latter are more important

than the former. The Colonel demarcates his two (opposing) value systems—social worker values and military values—yet he contends that his social worker values hold a higher precedent. Nevertheless, the Colonel privileges the mission of the force multiplier, following his military values, the larger military mission, and the soldier creed throughout the rest of his interviews with Haaken.

In repeatedly positing the mission of the force multiplier's importance throughout the rest of the text, the Colonel is repressing the mission associated with the social worker—to first and foremost protect soldiers' mental well-being—“shut[ting] [it] out in a repeatable, reiterated process of exclusion” (Parker, 2010, p. 164). The inconsistencies in the Colonel's allegiances display the gaps and holes, presupposing that “something else cannot or will not be said” (Parker, 2005, p. 171). With the emergence of this inconsistency in the Colonel's discourse, paired with the subsequent and repeated insistence of the mission of the force multiplier over the values of the social worker, the Colonel demonstrates a covering over of the gap; however, as a component of the Colonel's discourse and as an aspect of his identity that is repressed, the social worker values he professes are also a part of the discourse's inherent structure and the Colonel's unconscious (Parker, 2010).

In order to further trace the absences, gaps, and holes that structure the discourse between the Colonel and Haaken, one must examine the difference between the Symbolic and the Imaginary orders. The “register of communication” that the Colonel and Haaken maintain in the interview transcripts, allowing them to maintain the process of negotiation, belongs to the Imaginary order, while the “structural relations” (Parker, 2010, p. 163) and their asymmetrical subject positions comprise an aspect of the Symbolic order. While there appears to be coherent

Imaginary order communication between the two subjects, both Haaken and the Colonel occupy different structural positions that are asymmetrical to one another. Haaken, as one who challenges the Colonel's authority as a commander, is placed into a feminized position—that of the hysteric—which emphasizes the asymmetrical nature of subject positions in the “nonrelation” (Parker, 2010, p. 167) of sexual difference. The implications of these asymmetrical subject positions will be explored more below; however, the difference between the register of communication—Imaginary—and that of structural subject positions and power differentials—Symbolic—is another gap in discourse that is covered over, comprising the discourse of the Other.

The negotiation of the content of the mission—whether the long term mental health, and general well-being of the soldier for military behavioral health professionals is truly important—while never explicitly stated, is what drives the discourse between both Haaken and the Colonel, emerging as the *objet petit a* in their discourse. Whether there are two missions, to maintain the mental well-being of the individual soldier and maintain a large military fighting force, both by means of psychological techniques, or only one mission, keeping the soldier in the fight at all costs, serves as the “object cause of the dialogue” because it is never named, yet always “alluded to, looped around” (Parker, 2010, p. 164). It stands as “something indefinable and fascinating which we suppose in an analysis to be a 'cause' around which a speaker circles” (Parker, 2005, p. 171). Neither the Colonel nor Haaken come to an agreement about whether collapsing the two opposing missions is something that is tenable and beneficial to soldiers, nor do they ever explicitly address this as the object cause of their dialog. If the two of them were to address this directly, their Imaginary order communication would dissolve and the *objet petit a* would cease

to be the force that drives their discussion (Parker, 2010).

In the discussion over the identity of the soldier and their connectedness with the unit, the Colonel states that “taking the soldier away from where he or she feels connected can do more damage ... than taking that soldier and sending that soldier home” (personal communication, July 9, 2011). Haaken, in turn, questions whether this is a military psychological construction that trains the soldier “to hold on to their team, their unit, their battle buddy” (personal communication, July 9, 2011). The question of the mission’s true intention, either maintaining the soldier's mental well-being, potentially requiring medical evacuation of the traumatized soldier from the combat zone, or keeping the soldier in the fight at all costs is the cause around which the discourse circles. However, when the Colonel and Haaken address smaller questions about the identity construction of the soldier, these exchanges pertain to the larger question about the nature of the mission. The implicitly addressed larger question going unsaid provides evidence for equating the question of the mission's intention with the *objet petit a*.

The Role of Knowledge. The Colonel's devotion to both military values and the soldier's creed are again relevant when tracing the big Other in discourse. The analyst must locate the subject's supposition of knowledge in order to trace where power, authority, and the big Other lie in the text (Parker, 2005). Subjects' ego ideals are constructed through the imputation of knowledge, as one who supposes to know something is assuming the identity of one who carries both knowledge and authority. The construction of subjects' ego ideals is always in relation to the big Other, as the big Other functions in the Symbolic order, validating the subject's structural position and their identification with specific signifiers (Parker, 2005).

The Colonel frequently supposes knowledge in his interviews with Haaken, as he is both a representative of the United States military and situated within its discourse. The signifiers that make up the Colonel's ego ideal—his *points de caption*—in so far as they function as suppositions of knowledge and authority, also become relevant in the identification of the big Other in his discourse. As demonstrated above, 'military', 'loyalty', 'duty', 'resiliency', 'honor', 'Army values', 'soldier creed', and 'mission' are all signifiers with which the Colonel identifies strongly and which he presumes to have knowledge in regards to. As the commander of the 113th Army CSC Detachment, the Colonel speaks from a position of power and authority when in dialogue with Haaken about the role of military behavioral health professionals and what is best for soldiers whom he commands. The Colonel's discursive subject position of power and authority are validated in relation to a larger mission both for which he is advocating and upholding in his speech.

The meaning of the mission for the Colonel, to be a force multiplier, is a meaning, which that is validated in regards to the signifiers 'military' and 'Army values', but also 'America'. This is demonstrated when the Colonel speaks about the mission in regards to the feasibility of medically evacuating soldiers:

It's to accomplish the mission. ... You're going to have casualties. You're going to have casualties. That is the cost of war. You're going to have people who are depressed, and people who are anxious, people who are tormented. But that's part of war. We are at war. America. We are at war (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel regards the mission of the force multiplier, and the repercussions of this conception, as though it was completely inevitable; his use of the signifier 'America' as an interjection, almost as a method of punctuation, asserts the authority with which he validates the content of the mission. 'America', as a signifier, is also metonymically linked with the 'American public's

interests' as an additional source of authority, as the Colonel states, in relation to the glorification of war and the view the American public has of soldiers:

the issue is, is that we're at war. And for us to protect the American public's interests, to be an instrument of power, this is what we do. I don't want to romanticize it, I don't want to take away from it, it's just that this is what it is. ... There's a sacrifice that we have to make. (personal communication, July 9, 2011)

The big Other in the Colonel's discourse, his source of validation speaking from a discursive position of power, authority and can therefore be derived from an appeal to the signifiers 'military', 'soldier creed', 'Army values', and 'America'. Nowhere is this more present than in Haaken's final interview with the Colonel over the meaning of the therapist's mission as a force multiplier.

We ask a lot of our soldiers. They sacrifice a lot ... many are here because they believe in the mission and they believe in what they're doing. ... Yes, it can be painful. ... I think on the other side people can find meaning and purpose (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel maintains that in keeping soldiers in the fight, soldiers must sacrifice as required in order surpass the danger of mental trauma and find personal meaning and an identity in their mission. Acting as a force multiplier and keeping soldiers in the fight is what maintains this meaning and purpose, as the Colonel argues:

Taking the soldier away from where he or she feels connected can do more damage in the long run than taking that soldier and sending that soldier home. ... There is a lot of thought and time that is put into creating the military identity. ... But when you strip that identity from a person who has embraced it you're doing more harm than good (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel also speaks of acting as a force multiplier in more pragmatic terms where retaining high soldier numbers through behavioral health techniques is regarded as maintaining 'assets'.

It is getting more out of your assets. It's like when you can retain people who many times want to be in the fight, want to be by their buddies, when you can retain that and then

support them you're going to be more effective than if you ignore it and they are medevaced out of theater. ... (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel speaks from a discursive position of knowledge, power and authority when he dictates that maintaining soldiers' military identity ('sacrifice' for 'meaning and purpose'), effectively fulfilling the mission as a force multiplier, is more important than medically evacuating the soldier. The validation for his position is granted through an appeal to the 'military', 'Army values', and 'America' as the big Other, as the meaning of the mission as a force multiplier answers the question of 'What does the Other want of me?' (Parker, 2005).

In so far as 'the mission' and 'force multiplier' act as master signifiers for the Colonel, validated by the authority of the big Other, Haaken's challenging and questioning of this master signifier places her in Lacan's discourse of the Hysteric. When Haaken speaks from the discourse of the Hysteric, the dominant agential position is occupied by divided subjectivity (\$), or the speaker as lacking 'agent', motivated by the *objet petit a* to challenge the master signifier (S_1) as the bearer of knowledge (S_2) (Parker, 2005). Subjects in the position of the discourse of the Hysteric are barred from knowledge, providing resistance through questioning the authority figure as one who possesses the master signifier (Parker, 2010). Speaking from the agential position of divided subjectivity characterizes the subject's alienation from their desire upon entering the Symbolic order of the law and exemplifies one who is resistant to satisfaction offered by the embodiment of society's master signifiers (Bracher, 1993).

Haaken's discourse presents a direct challenge to the Colonel's assertion of the singularity of 'the mission', and its metaphorical substitute 'force multiplier', both of which occupy the status of master signifier. Haaken argues:

[the] mission ... to stay alive and bring my unit back alive ... that's a different mission

than the overall military objective. That becomes a different mission. ... The Army's aim militarily is to seize and hold ground. Now, but then there's a mental health mission that's separate from that. So when you talk about the mission, which mission

the military's overextended so it's been forced to embrace mental health in the way it didn't in the past. It's not just an enlightenment of policy, it's partly- you can't just keep telling, commanding people to march on. At some point the force will drop so that force multiplier is partly getting more out of your assets rather than just enlightened policy. ... the force multiplier concept worries me, it's kind of like giving athletes steroids to keep going in the short run. ... is there a worry about over-exhausting, keeping people with boosters and maybe overlooking when the forces really are worn out (personal communication, July 9, 2011).

Haaken maintains this resistance in the face of the discourse of the Master, which attempts to objectify her, dictating her desire. As a challenging voice in the face of the authority of a master signifier, Haaken's dissent is beneficial in the way that it approaches systems of knowledge and master signifiers critically as a divided and marginalized subject (Bracher, 1993).

Parker (2010) argues, however, that there are consequences associated with taking up the discourse of the Hysteric against the master signifier. The hysterical position is a stereotypically—and ideologically conditioned—feminine position which is structurally disprivileged and is frequently organized symbolically as a deadlock of perspective (Parker, 2010). Analyzing Haaken's dissent from this perspective demonstrates the way that positions of resistance against society's master signifiers are aligned with the feminine, and thus systematically discounted on a structural level despite Imaginary level coherence.

Deadlocks of Perspective. Just as the Colonel establishes absolute difference between the signifiers 'civilian' and 'military', there is no agreement—an absolute difference—reached between Haaken and the Colonel in relation to the meaning of this signifier 'mission'. Parker (2005) argues, this is a deadlock of perspective, circulating around the *objet petit a*, that

structures the entire discourse making their communication possible.

The Colonel contends that the mission of military behavioral health professionals is to be a force multiplier, to “keep the soldier in the fight ... sustaining soldiers ... medically or” using “behavioral health” (personal communication, July 9, 2011) to complete the mission. When Haaken contends that the mission to “stay alive and bring [the] unit back alive” is “a different mission” than the “overall military objective” (personal communication, July 9, 2011), the Colonel disagrees. The Colonel doesn't believe that the mission of a force multiplier is in contrast to, or even separate from, the “mental health mission” (personal communication, July 9, 2011) to care for the mental well-being of soldiers. This failure in agreement constitutes research criteria for this analysis, “a source of strength, not weakness, in the analysis” (Parker, 2010, p. 167).

For Parker (2005), discourse analysis should expose the deadlocks of perspective between subjects—Haaken and the Colonel—because these instances of absolute difference structure the subjects' relationship. While the discourse between Haaken and the Colonel seems to function coherently, their entire conversation is fueled by a disagreement in regards to the meaning of the mission stemming from structurally asymmetrical subject positions in the Symbolic order. The negotiation surrounding this disagreement is what moves the discourse, creating an exchange modeled around absolute difference.

Because Haaken occupies the discourse of the Hysteric, and the Colonel, speaking from the position of the master signifier, occupies the discourse of the Master, the non-agreement that structures their discourse can be interpreted through the non-relation of sexual difference (Parker, 2010). Sexual difference, and Lacan's oft-repeated statement 'there's no such thing as a sexual

relationship', pertains to the incompatibility of masculinized and feminized speech positions—structural, pertaining to the Symbolic order—under patriarchy, not to differences in biological sex differences (Parker, 2005, 2010). Identifying these differences in discursive positions and reading the exchange through a lens of sexual difference suggests that Haaken, as one who resists authority and the master signifier, by questioning the Colonel, is subject to a disprivileged—and ideologically conditioned—feminine versus masculine “pernicious binary opposition” (Parker, 2010, p. 167).

Bracher's Third Logical Step – the Non-Manifest Collective Subjective Factors

In the previous step, I utilized 14 of the 21 aspects of Parker's (2005, 2010) seven theoretical elements in order to locate elements of discourse responsible for the manifest and non-manifest subjective effects in the first and third steps (Bracher, 1993). The elements of discourse I have identified in the interview transcripts between the Colonel and Haaken include: 'the mission', with its metaphorical linkage to the signifier 'force multiplier', acting as a master signifier (S_1) that represses other significations of the 'the mission' in the discourse surrounding military behavioral health (system of knowledge, S_2); 'Army values', 'military', 'soldier creed' and 'America', that function as the Symbolic big Other granting validation to the Colonel's power, authority and knowledge; and the *objet petit a*, or the object cause of the discourse between the Colonel and Haaken, as the intention of the military behavioral health mission.

The third and final section of my analysis identifies the “non-manifest collective subjective factors”—constituting the “particular desires and specific contents of [the] ... ego ideal (Symbolic)” (Bracher, 1993, p. 76)—corresponding to the discursive elements in step two.

This section culminates in an examination of passive and active narcissistic desire in the text via two Symbolic order functions as identified by Bracher (1993): first, the Colonel's identification with the phallic signifier granting the feeling of autonomy and self-sufficiency in the subject; second, the incitement of the vel of alienation in the subject that dictates one should choose between identity, as granted through the phallic signifier, or being (*jouissance*).

Bracher (1993) defines the phallic signifier as

the supreme master signifier ... the signifier of a life that has succeeded in escaping from the limitations imposed on it ... free of castration, the deprivation of enjoyment, entailed by the various aspects of the Symbolic order or Law. (pp. 120-121)

Despite the phallic signifier's status as guarantor of unimpeded enjoyment, it is illusory as the phallus is always the positive manifestation of a gap or loss (no signifier can grant absolute autonomy) (Bracher, 1993; Žižek, 1989/2009). The vel (Latin word for 'or') of alienation is defined as the fundamental choice all subjects must make, upon acquiring language, between the preservation of their identity or their being—*jouissance*, which is lost upon subjecting oneself to the Symbolic order, the law, and the big Other, limiting the enjoyment of the subject (Bracher, 1993).

The choice between either being or identity entailed in the vel of alienation is unique, however, in that the vel “has as its consequence a neither one, nor the other” (Lacan, 1977/1998, p. 211). The subject, post language acquisition, in the process of psychoanalytic therapy, encounters the vel of alienation as the analyst attempts to alienate the analysand from their identity associated with alienating master signifiers. As Lacan (1977/1998) notes, if the subject chooses to maintain their being, an aspect of their subjectivity—identity—is missing; however, if the subject chooses to maintain an identity associated with the alienating master signifiers, they

lose the piece of “non-meaning” (p. 211) that comprises the unconscious, which is the basis for the subject's being. Lacan (1977/1988) argues that, while there is a loss inherent in either choice, the choice of maintaining one's being brings “a life deprived of something” (p. 212)—a lack, around which one's desire is drawn—while the choice of maintaining an alienating identity deprives the subject of being and identity, because the former is prerequisite for the latter. The goal of Lacanian psychoanalytic therapy, as the discourse of the Analyst demonstrates, is to move the subject towards the maintenance of their being, abandoning alienating master signifiers to induce the production of new master signifiers corresponding to their repressed desire—the *objet petit a*.

The discourse between the Colonel and Haaken corresponds closely to Bracher's (1993) assessment of political-rhetorical discourse in Ronald Reagan's speeches, and serves therefore as the model for this section of the analysis. Bracher's assessment of political-rhetorical discourse, as it functions in the Symbolic and Real orders, accounts for how ideological interpellation evokes the passive and active narcissistic desires of the interpellated subject discursively through the discourse of the Master. I show that the effect of interpellated subjectivity for an ideological cause, in the case of military mental health, is a sacrifice of one's being for an identity that is the product of a radical denial of lack in the big Other.

The Colonel's discourse exhibits what Bracher (1993) identifies as passive narcissistic desire, or the identification with signifiers that grant a sense of identity, simultaneously guaranteeing love and recognition from the Symbolic big Other. In so far as the big Other in the Colonel's discourse can be recognized as 'Army values', 'military', 'soldier creed', 'America', the signifiers that compose his ego ideal will correspond to those characteristics that are valuable for

accomplishing the mission, as the Colonel states “being in the military, the number one focus is on accomplishing the mission” (personal communication, May, 21, 2011). Along with the *points de capiton* 'loyalty', 'duty', 'respect' and 'resiliency', the signifier that most clearly defines the 'mission' for the Colonel is 'force multiplier'. 'Force multiplier', as metaphorically linked to the signifier 'mission' also operates as a master signifier, and, similar to Bracher's (1993) assessment of political-rhetorical discourse, the Colonel's speech in the interview follows the logic of the discourse of the Master.

The Colonel's use of master signifiers (S_1), constantly wielding power, knowledge, and authority through signifiers like 'Army, values' 'military', 'soldier creed', 'force multiplier' and 'mission', and asserting the omnipotence of these signifiers, he represses all lack (\$) in the big Other and in himself. However, these master signifiers simultaneously provide a sense of security and identity in place of the repressed lack and repressed surplus *jouissance* (*objet petit a.*) Following Lacan's theory of discourse, when the subject speaks from a position of authority and knowledge, they are repressing both a surplus of *jouissance* and a lack (\$) associated with the fallibility of the big Other as ultimate guarantor of meaning. The lack (\$) that is characteristic of the big Other as 'Army values', 'military', 'soldier creed' and 'America', is associated with the repression of Haaken's contention regarding the meaning of the mission, its inherent duality, and the futility of attempting to achieve the mission's dual purpose—to maintain a large and effective fighting force while remaining a therapeutic healer.

This imposition of master signifiers that replaces the lost *a* with a sense of identity provides an example of what Bracher (1993) defines as the gratification of the Colonel's passive narcissistic desire. The Colonel's movement—as an ideologically interpellated subject and one

who is actively interpellating other therapists by dictating their mission—through the gratification of passive narcissistic desire to the identification with his *points de capiton*—master signifiers that grant the big Other's recognition, gratifying his active narcissistic desire—functions via two key Symbolic order operations as defined by Bracher (1993): identification with the phallic signifier that is autonomous and self-sufficient, and incitement of the veil of alienation that dictates one should choose between identity and meaning, as granted through the phallic signifier, or being and *jouissance*.

Besides granting the Colonel both knowledge and authority, the master signifiers also compose a military identity that requires following a set of Army values, a way of life, soldier creed and, most importantly, the mission. As the Colonel structures his ego ideal through *points de capiton*, the sacrifice entailed in his specific identification carries with it a repressed lack that is encapsulated in Haaken's contentions. To cover over this repressed lack, the Colonel begins by positing a false lack of military identity, associated with both medical evacuation and not believing enough in the mission, that replaces the lost *a* and corresponds to the military identity he refers to in his speech.

Taking the soldier away from where he or she feels connected can do more damage in the long run than taking that soldier and sending that soldier home. ... There is a lot of thought and time that is put into creating the military identity. ... But when you strip that identity from a person who has embraced it you're doing more harm than good (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel posits a false lack, to cover over his own and the big Other's lack, by privileging 'the military identity' as crucial to maintaining the soldier's mental well-being. The Colonel's identification with the 'military', 'Army values' and 'force multiplier' privileges the mission of maintaining the military identity, and high numbers of troops in the combat zone, as both the

most important component of the military behavioral health mission and, paradoxically, the key to maintaining the mental well-being of soldiers.

This false lack of a military identity is addressed and fulfilled specifically by a further adherence to the Army values, soldier creed, and military identity. For the Colonel, this means following the mission. The mission is an integral part of the military identity, and fulfilling the mission is what leads to the maintenance of this identity. The mission and military identity are legitimized by identification with a phallic signifier, which is 'America', 'American fights', 'American public's interests', 'winning American wars' or 'freedom'. By identifying with these phallic signifiers, the Colonel is guaranteed the position of master, "a position in which one is autonomous, self-sufficient, and subjected to no external constraints" (Bracher, 1993, p. 123).

Nevertheless, the identification with this phallic signifier, granting both 'meaning and purpose' inherently requires soldiers to both sacrifice and possess resiliency. To believe in the mission is to identify with the phallic signifier as the Colonel states that soldiers must "sacrifice a lot" (personal communication, July 9, 2011) in order to complete the mission. Bracher (1993) identifies this necessary sacrifice, following Lacan, the "vel ... of alienation, which ... all speaking beings are forced to make a choice between their meaning and their being" (p. 123). The vel of alienation dictates that individuals must choose between acquiring an identity (meaning), through the embrace of a master signifier, or maintain their *jouissance* (being). If one selects to maintain their sense of being over an identity, they lose a sense of meaning in their lives; however, if one selects meaning and identity over *jouissance*, they will lose both components, as one's sense of identity is based upon being (Bracher, 1993).

The Colonel's discourse provides a perfect example of the vel of alienation in the way

that it requires sacrifice—of one's being—in order to establish a military identity through an identification with the phallic signifier of 'America' and 'winning American wars'.

There's a sacrifice that we have to make. And the question is are we willing to make those sacrifices? And to go in there thinking ... that I'm going to be harmed or I'm going to have casualties. We don't think of- that's not our major issue. Our major issue is we're built to accomplish missions. ... This is what we were charged to do. This is what we will do (Colonel, personal communication, July 9, 2011).

The Colonel's understanding of the military mental health mission, as that of a force multiplier, entails an immediate acceptance of casualties and the sacrifice of being as a necessary reality.

The emphasis in his discourse is focused completely on moving to embody and accomplish the mission, which strives to identify with and maintain military identity in soldiers—keeping them in the fight—at all costs. The Colonel's discourse, however, ignores the consequences inherent in this veil of alienation, demanding that the subject make the choice of military identity over mental well-being and *jouissance* by positing that the subject must necessarily sacrifice. The meaning and (military) identity contained in the phallic signifier, for the Colonel, is ostensibly more important and more valuable than one's life (Bracher, 1993).

Therefore, maintaining the military identity, following the mission, and 'winning American wars' results in sacrificing soldiers' mental well-being. The military behavioral health professionals' role, despite the role of their profession as a healer, is constructed paradoxically around promoting sacrifice for a sense of identity that is granted through acquiring the phallic signifier and following the mission. Lacan defines the outcome of this process as castration, as the phallic signifier is illusory, failing to exist as the ultimate guarantor of meaning and autonomy (Bracher, 1993).

'America' is utilized by and through the Colonel as a phallic signifier to motivate soldiers and military behavioral health personnel to accept castration and the veil of alienation that the phallic signifier promises to rid them of. No phallic signifier can guarantee a subject autonomy and self-sufficiency; no identity will ever help the subject regain the lost enjoyment (*a*) they have sacrificed in order to order to gain their identity. The military identity that soldiers acquire and military behavioral health professionals reinforce through the sacrifice of their mental well-being leaves the interpellated subject castrated because they have given up what provides the foundation—their being—of their newly gained identity. As the Colonel's discourse demonstrates, the Symbolic big Other of the 'military' covers over the lack that characterizes it through the presentation of phallic signifier—'America' and 'American values'—which fails to act as an absolute and infallible source of legitimation leaving the subject castrated.

Discussion

The final section of this thesis is broken into two parts, both of which review the Lacanian psychodiscursive work performed in the analysis section. The first part begins by reviewing how the Colonel's subjectivity has been examined using Parker's (2005, 2010) methodology following a Lacanian psychodiscursive method of analysis. This part will also review how the Colonel's subjectivity accords with the model of psychosocial subjectivity argued for by the community of Lacanian psychodiscursive scholars I have reviewed. This includes an engagement with the method of reflexivity argued for by Frosh and Baraitser (2008) and Parker (2005, 2010), connecting Lacanian psychodiscursive analysis with the discourse of the Analyst in the second part.

With the second part I conclude this thesis by utilizing Lacan's discourse of the Analyst, following Bracher (1993), to critique ideological interpellation. Bracher (1993) argues that through the process of analysis using his three logical steps the discourse of the Analyst will be invoked in the audience, causing the reader as subject to abandon ideologically interpellated subjectivity by master signifiers. I follow the steps that Bracher (1993) proscribes—alienation from master signifiers, exposing the fantasy, and traversing the fantasy—to suggest how ideological interpellation can be subverted in regards to the discourse between the Colonel and Haaken, delineating how the discourse of the Analyst functions.

The Colonel as Fragmented, Disorganized, and Polyvalent Subject

In this analysis, I have developed my psychodiscursive methodology utilizing 14 aspects of Parker's (2005, 2010) seven theoretical elements in the context of research on psychosocial

subjectivity and reflexivity conducted by a community of Lacanian psychodiscursive scholars (Frosh, 2007; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Saville Young & Frosh, 2010). I use Parker's (2005, 2010) 14 aspects to delineates the Colonel's subjectivity as fractured, complex and divided because his work is drawn upon so heavily by this community of scholarship to theorize about psychosocial subjectivity,.

This kind of subjectivity demands an analysis of the formal aspects of the subject's discourse—the play of signifiers—in order to expose the nonsensical signifiers that structure and drive the exchange (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Parker, 2005). As I have demonstrated, the signifier 'mission' stands out as overdetermined because of the multiple contradictory interpretations it is assigned and how often it is repeated. This exposes the signifier as overdetermined and made up of non-meanings, organizing the structure of the Colonel's discourse.

Just as the signifiers, such 'the mission', that represent the Colonel are overdetermined and composed of a lack of determinate meaning, his discourse is also composed of multiple conflicting narratives representing a complex, overdetermined, and divided subject underpinned by inexpressible desires (Frosh, 2007; Parker, 1997; Saville Young & Frosh, 2010). The Colonel is divided between what he identifies as a military identity, following the role of the ideal soldier-therapist, and his social worker values, producing a fragmented subjectivity. Each of these narratives correspond to different interpretations of the mission: the first mission, as a force multiplier, to maintain a large and effective fighting force, keeps soldiers in combat through the use of psychology, with little regard to the long term implications of sustained stress; the second mission, as a therapeutic healer of soldiers, takes the present and future mental well-being of

soldiers as its top priority. Both the Colonel and the signifier 'mission' are, therefore, overdetermined, as they are represented by different shifting meanings within a network of signifiers.

In order to respect overdetermination and the irreducibility of the psychological and social forces shaping subjectivity, I have resisted sense-making strategies that reduce the Colonel's subjectivity to a singular and coherent narrative that relies on essentialist internal psychic forces (Frosh, 2007). I have, instead, interrupted and disorganized the Colonel's subjectivity so as to examine how the subject makes sense of himself out of a network of signifiers, articulating multiple conflicting narratives, according to specific desires (Frosh, 2007; Saville Young & Frosh, 2010).

Both of the Colonel's identities are negotiated in the discourse with Haaken. Both identities are constructed out of a network of signifiers, some of which form the Colonel's *points de capiton* as he becomes the subject of enunciation. The *points de capiton* that make up the Colonel's ego ideal are always in reference to a desire conditioned by the military as the big Other. The Colonel's different identities—the ideal soldier-therapist, and the civilian social worker values—have missions that are at odds with one another, producing the signifier 'mission' as the discourse's nonsensical structuring element. The mission is what drives the communication between the Colonel and Haaken. However, the Colonel—speaking from the discourse of the Master—covers over this inconsistency by insisting that the mission is singular, fixing meaning in a text through imposed interpretation (Pavón Cuéllar, 2010). The discourse of the Master produces a forced or imposed interpretation, where the subject takes the position of the master signifier, determining the truth in order to cover over one's "fallibility" as a barred—

or fragmented—subject (\$) (Parker, 2005).

By keeping to the line of the Symbolic, focusing on the disagreements between the Colonel and Haaken, I have followed the Lacanian psychodiscursive argument to resist producing a fixed, coherent, and underlying meaning from the discourse. Dunker and Parker (2009) liken this kind of interpretive activity to a transcription or transliteration. The act of transcription distances itself from producing a “full ‘positive meaning’” as the analyst must make specific decisions in regards to exclusions, synonyms, the representation of gestures, etc. In eschewing the “interpretive paradigm”, one must call into question the idea of a “perfect translation” (Dunker & Parker, 2009, p. 63), and the idea that communication, as a whole, is an efficient process.

Framing the Colonel as a complex and fractured subject, composed of a plurality of paradoxical narratives, respects his subjectivity by refusing to fix or assign it a meaning in a pathological fashion. The interpellated subjectivity that the Colonel embodies and constructs, as one who interpellates (military behavioral health professionals under his command, members of the public interpreting the aim of military mental health, etc.), emerges as the product of a desire to be the object of the desire of the big Other, a motivation underlying all decisions in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacanian psychodiscursive interpretation recognizes this desire of the Other as socially negotiated, in an effort to avoid fixing subjectivity appealing to essentialist reasoning, and recognizes the potential for psychological and social change in the subject through an interactive process of forming new master signifiers in the dialog between analyst and analysand. This method of change requires, however, a reflexivity that is psychosocial, not centered on simply knowing the analysand in a more “down and deep” fashion, and an approach to analysis

that propagates new values in the subject according to their repressed desires—the discourse of the Analyst (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008).

Here I use reflexivity to make explicit my relation to institutional, political and cultural narratives, recognizing that my understanding of objective and subjective knowledge is conditioned by these connections (Dunker & Parker, 2009; Parker, 1994). The method of reflexivity I utilize takes the psychosocial dynamics of how subjectivity is formed—between the analyst and analysand—into consideration by analyzing my political investments and suppositions beyond my “personal investments” (Parker, 2010, p. 168) in the discourse. The psychosocial is concerned precisely with these social, political, theoretical, and institutional investments, as psychosocial subjectivity is formed within the intersubjective encounter between the analyst and analysand, and developed in relation to the cultural forces that hold sway on both subjects (Parker, 2005, 2010).

My position as discourse analyst is unabashedly politically leftist as I believe in the emancipatory potential of psychoanalysis and the Lacanian injunction to “stop this little mechanism” (Lacan, 1991/2006, p. 178) known as the discourse of the Master. I am interested in Lacanian psychodiscursive analysis and Lacanian cultural criticism so that I may utilize psychoanalytic theory's capacity to be politically progressive, identifying ideological interpellation and overcoming it (Parker, 2010). I recognize that discourse cannot function without master signifiers. However, I oppose the use of the discourse of the Master to silence politically progressive discussion, exercising tyranny over discourse to further cement oppressive political agendas. Like Bracher (1993), I hope to use Lacanian psychoanalysis as an interpretive strategy that will yield master signifiers that produce positive social change.

I am a student and a research assistant for Haaken (2011), whose aim in creating *MIND ZONE: Therapists Behind the Front Lines* was to examine the United States Military's use and abuse of mental health techniques to achieve the mission of maintaining high troop numbers through stress management. My understanding of the Colonel as an interpellated subject, and the mission of the force-multiplier as untenable, is influenced by my political investments and my discontent with the United States' foreign policy. My reading of the Colonel as one who is both interpellated by and interpellating an ideology that is detrimental is the product of the political investments that I espouse and my relationship to the *MIND ZONE: Therapists Behind the Front Lines* project.

Similar to Parker's (2010) analysis of a pre-conducted interview text, I possess the advantage of not having interviewed the Colonel or Haaken, allowing me to further avoid the urge to say, "what the text really means ... beyond what the reader can see" (p. 157). It is important to keep in mind, however, that Haaken as the interviewer has already framed these interviews in a specific way. The Colonel's discourse—through the framing of interview questions and transcript editing—has already been constructed to form a picture of him for an international film audience. My analysis, therefore, serves as a politically motivated reconstruction of a pre-constructed interpretation, no more valid than any other, yet simultaneously distanced and attached to the text on multiple levels.

In order to avoid using the discourse of the Master myself, forcing a singular coherent narrative on a subject's discourse, I occupy the position of the discourse of the Analyst. As the analyst speaks from a position of knowledge (S_2) the subject produces their own master signifiers, discovering the truth of their own desires (Parker, 2005, 2010). Parker (2005) notes

that the discourse of the Analyst encompasses reading a text from a psychoanalytic perspective, as the analyst reproduces and transforms the theoretical elements they identify—in the same way that Lacan argues that Freud “invented the unconscious” (pp. 177-178)—instead uncovering them within the mind of the subject.

The position of the discourse of the Analyst embraces the development of subjectivity socially within discourse, which resists “narrative wholeness” in interpretation, embracing the “incompleteness” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010, p. 527) and fragmentation of conflicting narratives. Bracher (1993), too, utilizes the discourse of the Analyst in his psychoanalytic cultural criticism to facilitate social change by subverting ideological interpellation. Ideological interpellation, through the discourse of the Master, enforces one totalizing narrative and denies incompleteness and conflict in subjectivity. In the subsequent section I explore the Colonel as ideologically interpellated subject, utilizing Bracher's (1993) psychoanalytic cultural criticism of ideological interpellation in order to produce new master signifiers to induce social change.

Lacanian Psychoanalytic Cultural Criticism of Ideological Interpellation

The psychodiscursive analysis I have performed on the interview transcripts between the Colonel and Haaken should strike the reader as alarming. The Colonel is dedicated to a singular mission for military behavioral health professionals—that of the force-multiplier—to keep a large number of soldiers in the fight by managing their stress in the short term, while emphasizing the importance of military identity and sacrifice for larger, more important, American values and interests. This emphasis fixes the meaning of the mission in the discourse, privileging the force-multiplier interpretation over the mission of the therapeutic healer—to regard the mental well-

being of soldiers as a top priority—instead of only utilizing short-term stress management techniques for the purpose of returning troops to the battlefield as soon as possible. The mission of the force-multiplier avoids a full medical evacuation whenever possible, even if this could ostensibly prevent post-traumatic stress disorder in the soldier.

Just as Bracher (1993) identified in the political-rhetorical discourse of Ronald Reagan a “general repression of lack” (p. 127) in the big Other, the Colonel exhibits his own denial of lack in the military and the United States of America as big Other. The denial of a lack in the United States Military’s system of managing mental health—which, to begin with, is incongruous with the protocols followed by trained civilian clinicians to manage mental health problems over a lifetime—leads to the validation of other denials of radical lack within the military mental health system. Just as with Reagan, “the result [is] that human suffering is exacerbated and the system is itself rendered even more deficient” (Bracher, 1993, p. 127).

One should look no further than the case of the 2012 massacre of civilians by a U.S. soldier in Afghanistan. Sgt. Robert Bales, who showed signs of suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms after his fourth combat tour and a mild traumatic brain injury, seemingly bypassed the United States Military’s mental health diagnostic testing at his home military base Joint Base Lewis-McChord (a base holding a controversial reputation for the reversal of approximately 300 post-traumatic stress disorder diagnoses in service members.) (Leonnig, 2012; “PTSD diagnoses at Lewis-McChord reexamined,” 2012) This general denial of a lack—or failure—in the United States Military’s mental health system have even lead to the disregard of research yielding promising results for controlling and preventing post-traumatic stress disorder (Russell, 2012).

The Colonel's denial of lack in the big Other, accompanying the dedication he possesses to the mission of the force-multiplier and American values and interests, is underpinned by unconscious passive and active narcissistic desires articulated in his discourse with Haaken. The articulation of these desires, through the construction of the Colonel's ego ideal, demonstrates the discursive practices that surround ideological interpellation as a force constructing his subjectivity. In order to properly incite psychological and social change, these desires must be addressed as the cause of interpellation. While it is unlikely that this thesis will enact social change by positioning the Colonel within the discourse of the Analyst, his audience—those prone to ideological interpellation—may benefit from the method of ideological subversion engaged in this critique.

The discourse of the Analyst must first alter the sense of identity in the subject through the subject's recognition of the ideological discourse's role in alienating them from their desires. Subsequently, the analyst must move the subject towards recognition of the lack in the ideological discourse with which they once identified to incite social change (Bracher, 1993). What will finally break the hold of ideological interpellation is the subject's acknowledgment and identification with the excluded part of their being, the *a*—the actual importance of the individual mental health of the soldier for military behavioral health professionals (Bracher, 1993).

Recognition of how the ideological discourse alienates the subject from their desire effectively moves the subject from the position of the discourse of the Master into the discourse of the Hysteric (Bracher, 1993). In order to move the subject into this position, the analyst must get the subject to recognize “the questionable, relative nature, and the debilitating effect, of

certain values or ideals” (Bracher, 1993, p. 71) contained in the master signifiers that comprise the ideologically interpellated subject's ego ideal. This requires that the analyst move the interpellated subject towards interrogating their own master discourse, which, in the case of the Colonel and his interpellated audience, would entail an exploration of the hollowness of nationalism and American values. The analyst may also choose to address the meaning of military identity and the way that inciting 'loyalty', 'duty', 'resiliency', and 'honor' is used to maintain high numbers of troops in combat at the expense of individual soldier's mental well-being. This alienation from master signifiers might appeal to the kinds of social worker values with which the Colonel identifies, conflicting with his military identity.

Haaken occupies the discourse of the Hysteric by combating the Colonel's master discourse, providing direct challenges to his claims of knowledge and authority. The discourse of the Hysteric has the subject speaking from a position of divided subjectivity (\$), motivated by the *objet petit a*, challenging the master signifier (S_1). Haaken is barred from knowledge and resists the Colonel's authority as one who possesses the master signifier (Parker, 2010).

While offering this voice of resistance is indeed important and plays a role in moving the subject towards the discourse of the Analyst, it also presents difficulties as articulated by Bracher (1993). First, the structural position of the discourse of the Hysteric as one that is characterized as feminine, positioning Haaken disadvantageously in relation to the Colonel's, ideologically conditioned, masculine position as one speaking from the discourse of the Master. This structural asymmetry in the Symbolic order makes resistance to master signifiers more difficult, as this position—and all subject positions characterized as feminine—is disprivileged within a patriarchal society. Second, Bracher (1993) notes that the discourse of the Hysteric, like that of

the discourse of the Master, still relies on locating master signifiers as objects that will satisfy a desire for “security and stability” (p. 67). Neither subjects nor discourses can do without master signifiers; however, the discourse of the Hysteric demands a master signifier from the other instead of producing, or inducing the production of master signifiers, itself (Bracher, 1993). This is why the discourse of the Analyst must be utilized as it appeals to the repressed desires in the subject in order to produce new values and master signifiers free of oppressive ideological interpellation.

Having induced a sense of alienation in the subject, the analyst must redirect the discourse to “expose the fantasy” (Bracher, 1993, p. 71) emphasizing the left out and repressed element, the *objet petit a*. Apropos the analysis undertaken in this thesis, it would be efficacious to explicitly address the cause of the discourse between the Colonel and Haaken—that of the true nature of the mission. Directly addressing the effects of the force-multiplier mission, confronting the failure to keep the soldier mentally fit and the failures associated with not medically evacuating those experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms—all for the direct benefit of the military and not the soldier—exposes how deeply the master signifiers associated with this mission alienate the subject, inducing an identification with the *a*. Identification with the repressed nature of the discourse replaces the current master signifiers occupying the ego ideal of the interpellated subject, hopefully, with a primary concern for the mental well-being of soldiers (Bracher, 1993).

Once the fantasy has been exposed, the analyst must engage in the final stage of the discourse of the Analyst called “traversing the fantasy” (Bracher, 1993, p. 72). This entails a separation from a “third repressed level of identification” (Bracher, 1993, p. 72), the *object petit*

a of the big Other, or the object of desire or *jouissance* of the big Other. The subject must recognize the big Other's deficiency, realizing that the fantasies they harbor by identification with the master signifiers upholding a military identity—including the phallic signifier, 'America'—contribute to overall suffering, and fail to satisfy one's desire (Bracher, 1993). As Bracher (1993) notes, “there is no transcendental meaning to be found for one's existence [through a phallic signifier], no ultimate object that will satisfy one's desire ... [no object] itself [that will] make life worth living” (p. 72). Thus, if this fantasy is traversed, the subject realizes that the fantasy alone is a means for *jouissance*, culminating in an expression of the previously repressed desire. The importance for maintaining individual's mental health—as opposed to privileging the military's desire to maintain high levels of troops—will ideally be expressed, producing an identification with a new master signifier that identifies with this formerly repressed desire (Bracher, 1993).

My examination of the interview transcripts between the Colonel and Haaken using the discourse of the Analyst presents a critique of ideologically interpellated subjectivity, addressing unconscious desire—the desire of the big Other—as a motivating force that must be considered. This thesis has examined the problem of the mission of military behavioral health professionals in Army CSC detachments, as articulated in interview transcripts between Haaken and the Colonel derived from *MIND ZONE: Therapists Behind the Front Lines*. I have utilized a Lacanian psychodiscursive analysis to emphasize how desire functions in the discursive practices constructing the Colonel's ideologically interpellated subjectivity. What this method of analysis, in conjunction with a Lacanian psychosocial interpretation of subjectivity, achieves is an investigation of the interpellated subject that addresses its socially negotiated and inherently conflicting nature, while also addressing the possibility of change in a way that avoids an

authoritarian treatment. This method is valuable in that it acknowledges (Lacanian) psychoanalysis' emancipatory possibilities, recognizing the indivisible interconnectedness of the individual with their social world and using this understanding to address social change by first inducing change on the individual psychological level.

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